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I. Introduction 
The Code contains two "pass-through" tax regimes for business entities. One 
is contained in Subchapter K, which applies to partnerships~ the other in 
Subchapter S, which, unsurprisingly, applies to S corporations. In the main:> 
both Subchapters tax the owners of the entities rather than the entities them.-
selves. Having two pass-through tax regimes creates obvious adm.inistra-
tive and other inefficiencies. There was a time when S corporations served 
a valuable purpose, particularly when taxpayers needed a fairly sim.ple and 
foolproof pass-through entity that provided a liability shield. But limited 
liability companies (LLCs), which are usually taxed as partnerships,l in most 
contexts m.ake S corporations obsolete. LLCs too can be fairly siIllple and 
foolproof, while providing the superior tax benefits of the partnership provi-
sions of Subchapter K.2 The advent and popularity of LLCs means that the 
inefficiency created by two separate pass-through tax regiIlles can no longer 
be justified. I propose that a new pass-through regime be created that retains 
Subchapter K and incorporates the best parts of Subchapter S, with the bal-
ance of Subchapter S repealed. Integrating these two pass-through regim.es 
requires that some changes be made to the C corporation provisions of 
Subchapter C as well. I also make Subchapter K available to IllOSt nonpublic 
C corporations, putting rnost closely held businesses on a level playing field. 
It has been difficult to justify Subchapter S for some time. In 1996, I 
published an article recommending the repeal of Subchapter S. 3 In a rather 
novel experience for a law professor, in 2004 there was a bill in the House of 
·Professor of Law. University of Baltimore. School of Law; I would like to thank Professor 
William Lyons of the University of Nebraska College of Law, Professor Fred Brown of the 
University of Baltimore School of Law, Pcofessor Sean M. O'Connor of the University of 
Washington School of Law, the participants at the 2008 Washburn University School of Law 
Partnership Tax Symposium, and the participants in the tax meetings of the 2008 Law and 
Society Conference (organized by Professor Neil Buchanan of George Washington University 
School of Law) for their decidedly helpful comments. This Article was written with the benefit 
of a research stipend from the University of Baltimore School of Law, for which I am grate-
fuL 
I See infra text accompanying notes 10-18. 
2See infra text accompanying notes 62-104. 
3Walter D. Schwidetzky, Is It TIme To Give The S Corporation A Proper Burial?, 15 VA. TAX 
R£v. 591 (1996) (hereinafter S Corp. Burial]. I draw freely from that article in writing this 
one. 
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Representatives that would have, among other things, enacted my proposal.4 
The bill, however, never became law and the tax system remains saddled with 
both tax partnerships and S corporations. 
The tax universe today is very different from. that of 1996. I continue to 
believe that Subchapter S should be repealed. It remains inefficient to have 
two pass-through tax regimes, and the repeal of Subchapter S is much more 
politically realistic than the repeal of Subchapter K, and indeed, perhaps more 
realistic today than it was in 1996. But there is also much additional grist for 
the mill, and, with a little prodding from som.e colleagues, I am reexamining 
the area. I am encouraged in my efforts by the fact that business entity tax 
reform is receiving heightened attention in Congress. 5 
S corporations offer a number oflegitirnate benefits not currently available 
to tax partnerships and those benefits should be incorporated into Subchapter 
K. Many of these benefits have corne to me fore since my 1996 article. Some 
derive from the simple fact that the S corporation is a corporation. For exam-
ple, parties who anticipate a public offering often use an S corporation, as it 
is a sitnple matter to convert it to a C corporation prior to the public offering. 
Etnployee Stock Option Plans, which by definition can only own corporate 
stock, often own stock in S corporations. S corporations are often preferred 
by the venture capital industry. The hope is that the S corporation will be able 
to tnake a public offering of its stock, or that the S corporation will become 
the target of a friendly takeover by. a public corporation. Those takeovers are 
much easier to structure on a tax-friendly basis if the target is a corporation. 
How can the needs of the parties making these and similar uses of S corpora-
tions be met in a world without Subchapter S? The solution I propose is to 
make it easier for partnerships to incorporate than is currently the case. 
Another benefit of S corporations is the so-called <'capital gain freeze" where 
taxpayers sell real property to an S corporation to "freeze" existing long-term 
capital gains before developing the property. I recommend that a comparable 
benefit be tnade available in Subchapter K. 
The changed tax and business environment cause me to recommend a 
bolder, more comprehensive approach than that which I recommended in 
my 1996 article. As noted above, I now recommend that almost all nonpub-
licly traded corporations be allowed to elect to be taxed under Subchapter 
K. Closely held businesses should at least have the option of playing on the 
same field. 
S corporations are also often used to improperly reduce or eliminate Social 
Security and Medicare taxes. The elimination of S corporations will, of course, 
end this abuse. 
4Srnall Business Modernization Act of 2004. H.R. 4137. 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter 
H.R. 4137]. 
5See J. CoMM. ON TAX'N. llOTH CONG., TAX REFORM: SELECTED FEDERAL TAX ISSUES 
RELATING To SMALL BUSINESS AND CHOICE OF BUSINESS, (Comrn.. Print 2008), availabk at 
http://wwvv.house.govl;ct/x-48-08.pdf [hereinafter JCX-48-08]. 
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But the repeal of Subchapter S will make more acute a problem that cur-
rently exists with the Social Security and Medicare tax provisions. These taxes 
are meant to apply to income from services. but the current rules may over- or 
understate the applicable tax liability. In conjunction with any business entity 
tax reform:t Congress must more dearly address when income is from services 
(and thus subject to these taxes) and when income is from capital (and thus 
not so subject). I recommend that, aside from portfolio income, all income 
of partnerships that are primarily engaged in the performance of services be 
subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes. For capital intensive partner-
ships, on the other hand, I recomm.end that partners be required to be paid 
reasonable compensation for their services. and that only this compensation 
be subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes. 
Part II of the Article discusses the tax entity selection process generally, as 
well as the basics of the taxation of C corporations, S corporations, and part-
nerships. Part III explores the tax advantages and disadvantages of partner-
ships and S corporations. Part IV looks at the data on the relative popularity 
of the major business entities and provides a possible explanation for the 
continued popularity of S corporations. Part V discusses H.R. 4137, a bill 
that was ahead of its time (and not unflawed). Part VI asks whether we should 
repeal Subchapter K instead. Part VII recommends that nonpublic corpora-
tions also be allowed to elect Subchapter K. Part VIII proposes taxpayer-
friendly methods for getting to my version of the prolTIised land, and Part IX 
gives a brief conclusion. 
II. Context 
A. Tax Entity Pigeon-Holing' 
As a general principle, for federal tax purposes, businesses have three entities 
from which to choose: The C corporation, the S corporation, and the tax 
partnership. State law corporations are always classified as corporations for 
federal tax purposes (C or S).7 State law unincorporated business entities, on 
the other hand, might be classified as any of these three entities for federal tax 
purposes (or if they have a single owner, silTIply be disregarded for federal tax 
purposes).8 Thus, a partnership for federal tax purposes may be something 
very different for state law purposes. The ubiquitous example is the LLC,9 
which is not a partnership for state law purposes, but typically is a partner-
G For those with tax expertise. what follows belabors the obvious. Think of it as outreach to 
rookies and foreign cross-trainers. 
7Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(l). 
8See Reg. § 301.7701-3. Of course, an individual doing business alone. and not through an 
entity. conducts business as a sole proprietorship. but that is not normally thought of as a sepa-
rate entity. Since it lacks any type of liability shield. it is also usually an unintelligent choice. 
Further. there are what might be called special-use entities that operate outside this universe. 
Examples include regulated investment companies. better known as ruCs or mutual funds. 
and real estate investment trusts. better known as REITs. See I.R.C. §§ 851. 856. 
9 A less ubiquitous example is the business trust. 
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ship for federal tax purposes. These differences between state law classification 
of business entities and federal tax law classification of those entities prompt 
use of the somewhat awkward term "tax partnership.) To the extent possible) 
I will avoid this awkward term. In general~ when I refer to a partnership~ I 
mean an entity treated as a partnership for federal tax purposes. 
Tax classification of entities has a long, at times combative, and often 
tedious history. 10 The Service finally grew weary of the effort it had to expend 
on tax classification issues, and quite sensibly came out with the "Check 
the Box Regulations" in 1996, which dramatically sirnplified things. 11 An 
eligible~ unincorporated state law entity generally may choose its status for 
federal tax purposes.1 2 If the "eligible entity"13 makes no election, it is dis-
regarded for federal tax purposes if it has a single lTlember (making it thus a 
"disregarded entity"),14 and it is taxed as a partnership if it has two or more 
nlernbers.ls Alternatively, the entity may "check the box," that is, elect to be 
taxed as a C corporation or, if it meets the qualifications, an S corporation. 16 
It would be out of the ordinary for an entity to check the box to be taxed as 
a C corporation,17 and somewhat unusual to check the box to be taxed as an 
S corporation, inducing sorne to say it makes more sense to call thern the 
"Don't Check the Box" Regulations. 18 
10 See BORlS BITTKER & JAMES EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS, § 2.01-2.04 (2000) [hereinafter BrITKER & EUSTICE]. 
11 Simplification of Entity Classification Rules. 61 Fed. Reg. 66584 (Dec. 18, 1996) (to be 
codified at 26 C.P.R. pt. 1); Reg. § 301.7701-1 to -3. 
12Reg. § 301.7701-3(a),-3(b)(1). There are a number of exceptions. Insurance companies, 
banks, entities owned by a state or a political subdivision of a state, and entities taxable as cor-
porations under provisions of the Code other than section 7701 (a)(3) are taxed as C corpora-
tions. See Reg. § 301.7701-2(b). My focus here is on state law, i.e. domestic entities. The rules 
are different for foreign entities. See Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(b)(B). -3(b)(2). 
13 An eligible entity is an entity that is not classified under the Regulations as a corporation. 
See Reg. 301.7701-3(a). Actual state law corporations are classified as corporations for federal 
income tax purposes. Other per se tax corporations include insurance companies and certain 
banks (though they typically also operate using a state law corporation). See Reg. § 301.7701-
2(b). 
14If the sole owner of the eligible entity is an individual, for tax purposes the entity is treated 
as a sole proprietorship. If the sole owner is a corporation, the entity is treated as a division or 
branch of the corporation. See Reg. § 301.7701-3(b). 
15Id. 
16Reg. § 301.7701-3(c). 
17But it is not unheard of. Indeed, if one prefers to be a C corporation, it can make sense to 
form a state law LLC rather that a state law corporation and check the box. LLCs commonly 
have ITlore ITlodern "statutory architecture," ITleaning they are more flexible and have a lesser 
reporting burden than corporations. See CARTER BISHOP & DANIEL KLEINBERGER. LIMITED 
LIABILITY COMPANIES: TAX AND BUSINESS LAw! 1.02 [hereinafter BISHOP & KLEINBERGER). 
t8See, e.g., LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HANDBOOK § 3 (Mark Sargent & Walter 
Schwidetzky eds., 2008). 
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B. C Corporations 
C corporations are not beloved because they are subject to two levels of tax. 
The C corporation is subject to a tax on its income at the corporate leveL 19 
and when the C corporation pays dividends, the shareholders who receive 
them are taxed again, typically at a 150/0 rate.20 A distribution is only a divi-
dend to the extent of a C corporation's nearnings and profits."21 Earnings 
and profits, to put it very roughly, are undistributed net earnings of a C 
corporation. 22 A contribution of property to the C corporation in exchange 
for stock is not taxable to the corporation under section 1032, but is a fully 
taxable exchange to the contributing shareholders unless the shareholders 
transferring the property have control of the corporation immediately after 
the transfer, defined, to oversimplify a bit, as 800/0 of the stock.23 If a C cor-
poration makes a nonliquidating distribution of assets to its shareholders, it 
must recognize any gain inherent in those assets at the corporate level, but 
is denied any such loss.24 If it is a liquidating distribution, gains are recog-
nized and losses may be recognized by the C corporation.25 On liquidation, 
shareholders generally recognize a capital gain or loss based on the difference 
between the money and fair market value of what is received and the basis 
in their stock, again assuring two levels of tax. In either a nonliquidating or 
liquidating distribution, the recipient shareholder takes a fair market value 
basis in the distributed property.26 
One might think that no one in his right mind would ever use a C corpora-
tion and indeed, most right-minded people do not. But there are exceptions, 
three of which deserve to be highlighted. Publicly traded entities normally are 
taxed as C corporations, so a business planning a public offering, especially 
19 See I.R.C. § 11. 
20See I.R.C. § 1 (h) (I 1). If you want more detail, see BITTKER &: EUSTICE, supra note 10. 
! 8.01-8.05. A dividend received deduction is available to corporate shareholders under sec-
tion 243. 
21See LRC. §§ 301(c)(l), 316. Distributions in excess of earnings and profits generally 
recover basis and then are treated as gain from the sale of the underlying stock. See LR.C. 
§ 301 (c)(I)-(2). 
22Numerous special calculations apply. See BITTKER &: EUSTICE, supra note 10, , 8.03-
9.04. 
23I.R.C. §§ 351(a). 368(c). Specifically, the owners must own stock (previously held or 
received on the exchange) possessing at least 80% of the total combined voting power of all 
classes of stock entided to vote and at least 800/0 of the total number of shares of all other classes 
of stock of the corporation. I.R.C. § 368(c). 
24I.RC. §§ 301(d). 311. The gains increase earnings and profits. Reg. § 1.312-7(b)(I). 
25 See I.R.C. § 336(a). Losses inherent in distributed corporate assets may only be recognized 
on a liquidating distribution, and then there are limits. See LRC. § 336(d). The recipient 
shareholder takes a fair market value basis in the property received. I.R.C. § 334(a). Gain or 
loss is generally not recognized on the liquidation of a corporate subsidiary and the corporate 
shareholder takes a carryover basis in the assets. See LR.C. §§ 332, 334(b). 
26LR.C. §§ 301 (d). 334(a). 
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an iInmediate one, might form a C corporation froIll the outset. 27 It Illight 
also select an S corporation and then switch to C corporation status, as I 
discuss below. C corporations often are preferred in international transac-
tions. Foreign countries Illay find it difficult to classify, and indeed Illay be 
cOIllpletely fluIllmoxed by, U.S. tax partnerships such as LLCs.28 Further, and 
Illore importantly, many tax treaties that the U.S. has with foreign countries 
give preferential treatment to dividend payments, making the C corporation 
(the only entity capable of paying a dividend) a rational choice for a U.S. 
business's foreign activities.29 The sometimes awkward operation of the U.S. 
branch profits tax also can make U.S. C corporation subsidiaries preferable 
for the U.S. business activities of many foreign corporations.30 Finally, one 
rnight select a C corporation for an extra "run up" the tax brackets. Under 
section 11, the rates of tax on C corporation taxable income range from 15% 
on the first $50,000 and 25% on the next $25,000 up to 350/0 on incoIlle 
over $10 Illillion.31 The maximum individual income tax rate is 350/0 under 
section 1 (i). A taxpayer whose marginal tax rate is 350/0 might be tempted to 
collect additional incorne in a C corporation to take advantage of the lower 
corporate rates, especially on taxable income up to $75,000. There are Code 
sections that would get in the way of serious abuse in this regard, including a 
flat tax rate of 350/0 for personal service corporations in section 11 (b)(2) , the 
accumulated earnings tax of section 531, and the personal holding company 
tax of section 54 ~. But rninor game playing, which in the aggregate may cost 
27 A publicly traded partnership is normally taxed as a C corporation. though there is an 
exception for publicly traded partnerships 90% or more of whose income is from certain pas-
sive sources. See LR.C. § 7704. 
28 For the German take on limited liability companies. see generally Helmut Krabbe. 
Steuerliche Einordnung tier nach dem Recht tier Bundesstaaten der USA gegrondeten Limited 
Liability Company, 10 INTERNATIONALE STEUERRECHT [ISTR] 351 (2004); Christiana 
Djanani, et al., Die Einordnungder LLC nach innerstaatlichem deutschen und US-amerikanischen 
Steuerrecht. 14 INTERNATIONALE STEUERRECHT [ISTR] 481 (2004). 
29 See, e.g., Convention Between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany for 
the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes 
on Income and Capital and to Certain Other Taxes. U.S.-ER.G. art. 10(2), Aug. 29, 1989. 
5 U.S.T. 2768. An outbound transaction is one in which a U.S. taxpayer invests outside the 
United States. 
30The U.S. corporate subsidiaries are always C corporations as corporations and nonresident 
aliens cannot be shareholders of an S corporation. See LR.C. § 1361(b). For a discussion of 
why a foreign corporation would prefer to operate with a U.S. corporate subsidiary rather than 
a branch. see generally Fred Brown, Reforming the Branch Projirs Tax to Advance Neutrality. 25 
VA. TAX REv. 1219 (2006). 
31The rate goes to 340/0 for taxable income above $75,000 but not exceeding $10 million, 
and 35% for taxable income over $10 million. The benefit of the graduated rates below 340/0 
are phased out for corporations with taxable income between $100,000 and $335,000, and 
the 340/0 rate is phased out for corporations with taxable income over $15 million. See l.R.C. 
§ 11. Note that the application of section 199 can result in a lower effective tax rate. The tax 
rate on dividends paid to individuals is generally 15% • See I.R.C. § 1 (h)(ll). 
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the fisc dearly~ is possible and is reported to take place. 32 
Lest I leave the novice reader with the impression that all C corporation 
users are stuck with a double tax, let tne quickly add that this is far from 
necessarily the case. C corporations often seek to «zero out)) their income 
by, atnong other things, paying deductible salaries to shareholder-employees, 
paying deductible interest to shareholder-creditors, and paying deductible 
rent to shareholder-landlords. Many a lawyer has becotne enriched doing 
battle in court over what counts as a reasonable salary, a reasonable atnount 
of debt. or a reasonable atnount of rent. 33 Further, the deductibility of interest 
when contrasted with the nondeductibility of dividends can encourage a C 
corporation to have an excessively debt-heavy financial structure.34 
The relatively new tax rate on dividends of 150/035 sotnetimes stands the 
corporate tax world on its head. Salary, interest incotne, and rents are all taxed 
at ordinary incotne rates of up to 350/0. It can tnake more sense to pay a non-
deductible dividend than, for exatnple. a deductible salary to a shareholder-
employee, especially for C corporations with low tnarginal income tax rates 
that have shareholders with high marginal rates. This change of pace is utterly 
counterintuitive to battle-hardened tax veterans. 
C. S Corporations 
S corporations were in many respects designed with the smaller business in 
mind, though there is no dollar limit on their size. and many are quite size-
able with numerous employees.36 An S corporation is a pass-through entity. 
Generally, there is no corporate level tax. Instead, to recite the statutory 
litany, income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit of the S corporation flow 
through to, and are taken into account by. the shareholders, retaining the 
character they had at the corporate level. 37 Allocations of these itern.s to the 
shareholders are based on shareholders' percentage of stock holdings.38 An S 
corporation is subject to the Subchapter C rules for property contributions 
and distributions. Thus, a contribution of property to the S corporation in 
32 See John W. Lee. A Populist Political Perspective of the Business Tax Entities Universe: "Hey 
the Stars Might Lie But the Numbers Never Do, .. 78 TEX. L. REv. 995 (1999). 
33 See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10. , 8.05. 
34 See I.R.C. § 163(a); see generally, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, OFFICE OF TAX POLlCY, 
APPROACHES TO IMPROVE THE COMPETITIVENESS OF THE U.S. BUSINESS TAX. SYSTEM FOR THE 
21 ST CENTURY (Dec. 20, 2007). In one of the more hilarious chapters of tax history (yes. it is 
possible for tax to be funny), Congress in 1969 enacted section 385, authorizing the Service to 
issue regulations defining debt and equity. The Service tried early on, got shot down. and has 
not worked up the nerve to try again since. Some 40 years have gone by since the enactment 
of section 385, and we are still waiting for the regulations (not that many tax advisors want 
the Service to work up that nerve). See James Eustice, <Debt-Like' Equity & 'Equity-Like' Debt: 
Treasury's Anti-Hybrid Proposals, 71 TAX NOTES (TA) 1657. 1657 (June 17. 1996). 
35 See Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Act of2003. Pub. L. No. 08-27. 117 Stat. 752 (2003). 
*'See BITTKER & EUSTICE. supra note 10,,6.01. 
37 See I.RC. § 1366. 
38I.R.C. § 1377(a). 
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exchange for stock only goes untaxed if the contributors meet the 800/0 con-
trol test of section 351 (a) ifllmediately after the contribution.39 Further, the 
S corporation recognizes gain (which normally goes untaxed at the corporate 
level and flows through to shareholders along with other corporate income) 
when it distributes appreciated property to shareholders.40 Losses inherent 
in distributed property may only be recognized in a liquidating distribution, 
and then limitations apply.41 
Generally,. a shareholdees share of the S corporation's income increases her 
basis in her stock, and losses and distributions reduce that basis.42 Losses filay 
only be deducted to the extent of the stock basis and any basis in debt the 
corporation owes the shareholder.43 Unused losses may be carried forward 
indefinitely.44 Distributions generally are not taxable to the shareholder unless 
the amount of money and fair market value of property distributed exceed 
the shareholder's stock basis. The excess is viewed as gain from the sale of the 
stoCk.45 
This rather pleasant state of affairs changes if the S corporation has previ-
ously been a C corporation or been combined on a tax favored basis (i. e. 
without being fully taxed) with a C corporation. As long as it meets the quali-
fication requirefilents, there are no restrictions on a C corporation becoming 
an S corporation. Further, the reorganization rules of section 368 apply to S 
corporations. Thus,. for example,. it is possible for a C corporation to merge 
tax free into an S corporation.46 
An S corporation does not ordinarily pay dividends. That is the province of 
C corporations. Only a C corporation can generate earnings and profits.47 An 
S corporation can, however, inherit the earnings and profits of a C corpora-
tion if it was once a C corporation or if a C corporation merged into it.48 If 
an S corporation has earnings and profits, it is possible for the S corporation 
to distribute a dividend which, like any dividend,. is income to the recipient 
shareholder (and that thus does not fall under the distribution rules described 
above). To simplify a bit, an S corporation generally is considered to first 
make distribution of its own net earnings. Distributions in excess of its own 
net earnings generally come out of the earnings and profits, and thus consti-
tute dividends and income to the shareholders, until the earnings and profits 
are eliminated.49 Dividends do not affect shareholders' stock bases.50 
39I.RC. §§ 351(a), 368(c); see supra text accompanying notes 22-25. 
4°I.R.C. § 311 (h). 
41 See I.R.C. § 336. 
42I.R.C. § 1367. 
43I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1). 
44I.R.C. § 1366(d)(2). 
4sI.R.C. § 1368. 
46See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A). 
47 See supra text accompanying notes 19-22. 
48See I.R.C. § 381(a). 
49See I.R.C. § 1368(c). 
50See I.R.C. § 301(c). 
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Section 1374 applies a corporate level tax on the S corporation at the high-
est C corporation tax rate when the gains from certain assets are recognized. 
Covered assets are those held by the C corporation at the time it makes an S 
election or those that find their way from a C corporation into an S corpora-
tion on a tax favored basis, such as through a merger. 51 Section 1374 ceases 
to apply ten years after the C corporation makes the S election or after an 
asset finds its tax favored way into S corporation solution. 52 Additionally, sec-
tion 1375 applies a corporate level tax at the highest C corporation tax rate 
to "excess net passive income"53 if the S corporation has earnings and prof-
its.54 Passive income is income from sources such as dividends and royalties.55 
Generally, net passive inco.me is gross passive inco.me .minus expenses to earn 
it and excess net passive inco.me is net passive income in excess of 250/0 of 
gross receipts. In sections 1374 and 1375, Congress is clearly trying to pre-
serve the double taxation attributable to the erstwhile C corporation. 
The rules governing qualification as an S corporation also can present prob-
lems. These rules have been dramatically liberalized over the years, in part to 
make the S corporation more competitive with partnerships, but still provide 
very real limits on the use of S corporations. An S corporation fllay not have 
more than 100 shareholders56 (as recently as 1995 it was 35 shareholders, 57 
and in the early days it was ten shareholders58), and may not have more than 
51 See I.R.C. §§ 368(a)(l)(A), 1374(a), and 381(a); see also Reg. § 1. 1374-1 (e). 
52 Further. the maximum gain subject to the section 1374 tax cannot exceed the net gain 
inherent in the C corporation assets at the time of the S election or at the time of the tax-fa-
vored transfer to the S corporation. The gain recognized under section 1374 on any individual 
asset cannot exceed the net gain inherent in it at either of those times. 
53 Essentially, passive investment income less the expenses to earn that income. See I.R.C. 
§ 1375(b)(2). 
54 Distributions deemed to corne out of earnings and profits are taxable dividends to the 
recipient shareholders. I.R.C. § 1368(c)(2). 
55See I.R.C. §§ 1375(b)(3), 1362(d)(3). 
56 Actually. as members of a family can be treated as one shareholder, an S corporation can 
have thousands of shareholders, albeit ones that are related. See I.R.C. § 1361 (c) (l)(A)(ii). 
57I.R.C. § 1361 (b) (1)(A) (1995). 
58See LR.C. § 137I(a) (1958). 
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one class of stock (though differences in voting rights are allowed).59 There 
are rules for who Dlay and who may not be S corporation shareholders. The 
"Dlay not" group includes nonresident aliens, financial institutions that 
use the reserve Dlethod of accounting contained in section 585 (applies to 
Dlany banks), insurance companies, corporations electing under section 936 
(which allows credits for certain incoDle froDl Puerto Rico), and Domestic 
International Sale Corporations (now something of an antique, as they have 
been held to violate the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).60 The 
"Dlay" group is liDlited to individuals, their estates, certain trusts (in general, 
voting trusts and trusts which are faDlily oriented), qualified pension trusts, 
and section 510(c)(3) charitable organizations. Note that corporations (C 
or S) are not on the allowed list of shareholders, so generally a corporation 
Dlay not own stock in an S corporation. There is one limited exception: an S 
corporation Dlayown a qualified Subchapter S corporate subsidiary (QSSS), 
have the benefit of the subsidiary's liability shield for state law purposes, but 
have the subsidiary ignored for tax purposes, with all income and expenses 
flowing through to the parent.61 It often makes Dlore sense, though, for the 
S corporation to use a wholly owned LLC, as there are fewer qualification 
requirements. There is no restriction the other way around, and an S corpora-
tion may own stock in a C corporation. . 
S corporations that once tangoed with C corporations have to be watch-
59LR.C. § 1361(b)(I), (2). A husband and wife and frunily members can be treated as one 
shareholder. See I.RC. § 1361 (c) (I) (A), (B). Often it is not clear why certain of the limitations 
on the use of S corporations were chosen. With regard to the one class of stock rule, however, 
there is a hint in the legislative history in this regard. The original drafters of subchapter S 
may have been concerned that the issuance of a class of preferred stock might have made it 
difficult to tax current earnings to shareholders. They may also have questioned how to tax 
dividends on preferred stock. See S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 4667 (1954), which briefly discusses 
the complexities of having dividends on preferred stock in the context of a proposed bill that 
foreshadowed subchapter S. As the use of the S corporation accumulated adjustment: account 
and the proposed S Corporation Reform Act of 1995 demonstrate, these problems are solv-
able. See I.R.C. § 1368(c)(1), (e)(I); see also JAMES EUSTICE & JOEL KUNTZ, FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION OF S CORPORATIONS' 7.06 [hereinafter EUSTICE & KUNTZ]; Curtis J. Berger, 
W(h}ither Partnership Taxation, 47 TAX L. REv. 105, 141-43 (1991). 
As with all corporations that borrow funds from their shareholders, there is a risk that this 
debt could be classified as equity, and thereby perhaps constitute the prohibited second class of 
stock. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10, ,4.02. Section 1361(c)(5) provides some relief 
in this regard, providing that irrespective of the debt to equity ratio. "straight debt" will not be 
reclassified as equity. To qualify as straight debt. the debt must be payable on demand or at a 
date certain, generally the interest rate must not be contingent. the debt must not be convert-
ible, and the creditor must be an individual, an estate, a trust that qualifies as an S corporation 
shareholder, or a commercial lender. See LR.C. § 165I(c)(5)(B). 
6OLR.C. § 1361(b)(1)(C), (b)(2); see also Tax Understanding, Dec. 7-8, 1981, GATT 
B.LS.D.28S/114. 
61LR.C. § 1361(b)(3). Note that since an S corporation can own stock in other corpora-
tions, it can be part of an "affiliated group" (though outside of the QSSS rules, a corporation 
may still not be a shareholder). This was once prohibited. See EUSTICE & KUNTZ, supra note 
59, , 3.06. 
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fut, but otherwise life is pretty good, or at least so it seems until the taxpayer 
learns of the advantages of Subchapter K. The grass is always greener. As I will 
discuss next, generally partnerships offer a still better tax deal than S corpora-
tions, but there are situations when S corporations have the upper hand. I will 
address these advantages after the partnership discussion. 
D. Partnerships 
Partnerships are also not subject to an entity level tax. Items of incorne, gain, 
loss, deduction, and credit flow through to, and are taken into account by, the 
partners, retaining the character they have at the partnership leve1.62 Taxable 
income increases a partner's basis in his partnership interest; deductible loss 
reduces that basis.63 A partner may not deduct losses in excess of this "outside 
basis," though unused losses may be carried forward indefinitely.64 Other per-
tinent details of partnership taxation follow. 
Complexity is a large problem in the partnership tax arena. The partner-
ship tax regirne need not make the life of a given taxpayer cornplex, but it 
often does. As is not uncommon with tax law, there is tension between com-
plexity and precision on the one hand, and adrninisterability and taxpayer 
cornpliance on the other hand. Further, in a preview of things to come, that 
complexity can lead to abuses, in which case there can be complexity and 
imprecision, not the best of both worlds.65 
III. Advantages and Disadvantages of Partnerships and S Corporations 
A. Advantages of Partnerships over S Corporations 
Most tax professionals will affirm that on balance a partnership is, from. a 
federal incom.e tax perspective, superior to an S corporation. I now review 
the advantages. I intersperse a few S corporation advantages in this discus-
sion when they are directly related to the partnership advantage for easier and 
m.ore efficient understanding. These interspersed S corporation advantages 
are rarely, if ever, im.portant enough to cause one to prefer an S corporation to 
a partnership. Those S corporation advantages that can make it the preferable 
vehicle I discuss separately below. 
1. Contributions and Distributions 
Tax-free contributions of property are more readily achieved using the part-
nership form. Normally, no gain or loss is recognized on a contribution of 
property to a partnership in exchange for a partnership interest.66 There is no 
800/0 threshold as there is with corporations, in fact there is no threshold at 
all. 
62LR.C. § 702. 
63I.R.C. § 705. 
64I.R.C. § 704(d). 
65For an exrunple of an abuse in this context. see Regulation section 1.701-2(d). ex. 9. 
66I.R.C .. § 721 (a). 
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If a partner makes a contribution of property to a partnership> under sec-
tion 704(c)(l)(A), any gain or loss inherent in the property on contribu-
tion is taxed to the contributing partner when the partnership disposes of 
the property.67 There is no analogy to section 704(c)(1)(A) in Subchapter S. 
Though a shareholder may make a tax-free contribution of property to an 
S corporation under section 351 (a» upon disposition of that property, any 
inherent gain or loss is allocated to all of the shareholders based on their stock 
holdings.68 Thus, a shareholder contributing appreciated property could. on 
a disposition of the property by the S corporation, effectively shift a portion 
of the gain to other shareholders.69 As a consequence of that gain, the other 
shareholders could see their stock bases increase to an a.mount in excess of the 
fair nIarket value of their stock. The other shareholders might not be able to 
take advantage of the loss inherent in the stock until the stock is sold, which 
could be well into the future. Further, the shareholders' recognized loss on the 
stock normally is a capital loss whereas the gain on the sale of the contributed 
property may be ordinary income, resulting in a character distortion in addi-
tion to a tinIing distortion. Finally, adding insult to injury, if a shareholder 
with a loss in his stock dies before disposing of the stock, he takes his loss with 
hi.m.70 The loss disappears because his heirs take a fair market value basis in 
the stock under section 1014. 
The lack of an S corporation equivalent to section 704(c)(1)(A) can work to 
the benefit of shareholders who contribute appreciated property because the 
pre-acquisition gain is shifted to others, and to the disadvantage of sharehold-
ers who contribute nIoney. The converse is the case if depreciated property 
is contributed. However, well-informed parties dealing at arm's length factor 
this issue into the allocations of stock to the shareholders. In a family context> 
where the parties are not dealing at arm's length, the lack of a section 704(c) 
(1)(A) analog may permit some income shifting amongst the shareholders. 
This can happen in a nonfamily context as welL where the shareholders to 
whom the gain is shifted have offsetting net operating loss carryforwards or 
are tax exempt. It seems unlikely, however, that given the other advantages of 
Subchapter K, that the lack of a section 704(c)(I)(A) analog drives many, if 
any, choice of entity decisions.71 
In contrast to an S corporation, generally no gain or loss is recognized 
67There is a whole lot more to it than that. For example, tax depreciation generated by the 
property is allocated to the other panners to the extent of their shares of "book depreciation." 
Further, because section 704(c)(l)(A) by its terms can work imperfectly, Regulation section 
1.704-3 provides three methods for applying it, the traditional method. the traditional method 
with curative allocations, and the remedial method. 
68I.R.C. § 1366(a). 
69The converse is the case if the property has an inherent. recognizable loss, but in that event 
the shareholder is more likely to sell the property and contribute me resulting cash. 
70 As the heirs generally take a fair market value basis as of the date of death under section 
1014, the loss is effectively eliminated. See I.R.C. § 1014. 
71 Section 1366(e) limits some abuse in the S corporation context. The partnership rule has 
a sounder tax and economic foundation. 
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when a partnership distributes property to its partners.72 Normally the recipi-
ent partner takes a carryover basis in the distributed propertyJ3 Obviously, 
the partnership rules are normally more favorable to taxpayers than the S 
corporation rules. Further, the tax cost of withdrawing property froITl an S 
corporation is often too high to justify the distribution. Current law prevents 
many S corporations froIn liquidating and converting to other forms of busi-
ness enterprise, even if they would otherwise prefer to. 
Sections 707(a)(2)(b), 704(c) (1) (B) and 737 contain cOInplex rules 
designed to prevent taxpayers froITl using the tax-free contribution and distri-
bution rules for partnerships to disguise what is in substance a taxable sale or 
exchange.74 There is no analog in the S corporation provisions. Of course, in 
an S corporation it is Inore difficult to Inake a tax-free contribution, and any 
gain inherent in distributed property is recognized on distribution.75 These 
disadvantages Inake a cOITlparable anti-abuse rule for S corporations less nec-
essary. 
2. Allocations 
A partnership is allowed to make "special allocations" to its partners. For 
eXaInple, SOIneone who is otherwise a 500/0 partner can be allocated 900/0 of 
nLR.C. § 731 (a). 
73LR.C. § 732(a)(1). However, that basis can never exceed the recipient partner's basis in his 
or her partnership interest. LR.C. § 732(a)(2). 
74Section 707(a)(2)(B) was Congress's first pass at this area. It addresses the situation in 
which chere is a direct or indirect transfer of money or property by a partner to a partnership 
and a related direct or indirect transfer of ITloney or other property by the partnership to the 
partner. If the facts indicate chat the transfers are in substance a sale or exchange, that is how 
they are treated (and not as a nontaxable contribution and distribution under sections 721 
and 731). The Regulations provide a presuITlption that if the exchanges take place within two 
years of one another, there is a rebuttable presumption that they are related, subject: to some 
exceptions. Reg. § 1.707-3(c)(I). 
Sect:ion 704(c)(1)(B) of the Code provides that if a partner contributed property to a part-
nership and that property is distributed to another partner within seven years of the contri-
bution, the contributing partner recognizes any gain or loss froITl the sale of the property. 
The gain or loss recognized is the aITlount that would have been recognized under section 
704(c)(l)(A) if the property had been sold at its fair market value at the time of the distribu-
tion. 
Section 737 of the Code provides that if a partner contributes appreciated property to a 
partnership. and other property is distributed to the contributing partner within seven years, 
the contributing partner recognizes gain to the extent of the lesser of the aJTI.ount by which the 
fair ITlarket value of the distributed property exceeds the partner's basis in his or her partnership 
interest or the net precontribution gain. The net precontribution gain is defined as the gain 
that would have been recognized under section 704(c)(I)(B) if the contributed property had 
been distributed to another partner within seven years of the contribution. 
Note that section 707(a)(2)(B) does not autoITlatically apply, whereas sections 704(c)(1)(B) 
and 737 do. If it does apply, section 707(a)(2)(B) makes the transaction fully taxable. That is 
not necessarily the case with the other two code sections. 
75 See supra text accompanying notes 38-40. 
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the depreciation deductions.76 In an S corporation~ all allocations of income, 
loss or deductions, must be based on the shareholders' stock holdings.77 Under 
certain circumstances:> an S corporation can effectively vary that allocation. 
It can pay a shareholder-employee a larger salary in a given year. A deserv-
ing shareholder-employee can be given an option to buy stock that can be 
exercised to increase corporate ownership, and thereby increase income and 
loss allocations.78 "While these substitute methods can be helpfuL they are just 
that, substitute methods, and do not offer the flexibility of the special alloca-
tions rules available to the partnership form. 
3. Entity Debt" 
Under section 752, an increase in a partnees share of partnership liabilities 
is treated as though the partner contributed money to the partnership to the 
extent of her share of partnership liabilitiesJ9 Like any other contribution, 
these amounts increase the partner's basis in her partnership interest.8o It is 
difficult to overstate the value of being able to increase outside basis with 
partnership debt. A partner is allowed to deduct her share of partnership 
losses to the extent of that basis.sl 
In all but one of the circuits that have examined the issue, debt incurred 
by an S corporation does not increase the shareholders' stock bases, even if 
the shareholders' guarantee the debt and the creditors view the shareholders 
761n order for a special allocation to be allowed. under the safe harbor it must have "substan-
tial economic effect." I.R.C. § 704(b). The substantial economic effect test has two parts, the 
"economic effect test" and the "substantiality test." Reg. § 1.704-1 (b)(vii)(2). 
In order for the economic effect test to be met, partners' capital accounts must be main-
tained in accordance with certain rules. The capital accounts must be increased for the fair 
market value of contributed property (net of associated debt), money contributed, and allo-
cable partnership income. The capital accounts must be decreased for the fair market value of 
distributed property. money distributed. and partnership losses. Reg. § 1.704-l(b)(2)(iv)(b). 
The other requirements of the economic effect test are that a partner must be paid the bal-
ance of her capital account on liquidation of her interest. and if a partner has a deficit capital 
account, she must restore it on liquidation of that interest. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b)(2)(ii). Under an 
alternative safe harbor, an allocation is allowed even if a partner does not have a deficit restora-
tion obligation, provided, inter alia, the allocation does not cause or increase a deficit account 
balance. These are sometimes known as the qualified income offset or «QIO" rules. See Reg. 
§ 1.704-1 (b)(2) (ii)(d). 
The substantiality test requires that the economic effect of an allocation of a partner be 
"real." For example. if a partner is allocated a loss, on a present value, after tax basis, his posi-
tion must be diminished and that of the other partners must be enhanced. If this does not 
occur, the economic effect of the allocation is not substantial. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b )(2)(iii). 
77I.R.C. § 1366(a). 
78This option should not violate the one-class-of-stock rule. Reg. § 1.1361-1(l)(4)(iii)(B) 
(2). 
79 Similarly, a decrease in a partner's share of partnership liabilities is treated as a distribution 
of money. I.RC. § 752(b). 
8°I.R.C. § 705(a)(1). 
81$ubject to the loss limitation provisions of Code sections 465 and 469. 
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as the prirnary payors.82 A shareholder of an S corporation can only deduct 
losses to the extent of the basis in the stock plus the basis of any loans by 
the shareholder to the corporation.83 A shareholder's inability to include an 
appropriate share of corporate debt in stock basis can thus be troublesorne. 
To avoid the iInpact of this rule, a shareholder can borrow the funds directly 
and then loan or contribute the funds to the corporation, thereby receiving 
an increased stock or debt basis, against which losses can be deducted. Not all 
shareholders are well enough advised to know to borrow the funds directly. 
Further, when the debt is secured, loaning the funds via a shareholder is 
often awkward. Who would own the secured property, the corporation or the 
shareholder? If the corporation, why would the corporation provide security 
for a loan to a shareholder? Is the provision of security a distribution to the 
shareholder? If the shareholder owns the security, is it property the corpora-
tion needs? Would it have to be rented to the corporation? Is adequate liabil-
ity insurance available to protect the corporation and the shareholder against 
rnishaps while the corporation uses the property? What if an S corporation 
(especially one with nurnerous shareholders) wants to buy a property subject 
to debt? Is it practical to have the shareholders buy the property, contribute 
it to the corporation, but stay pritnarily liable on the debt? What if the debt 
secured by the property is nonrecourse and therefore it is not possible for the 
shareholders contributing the property to remain liable on the debt? Finally, 
lenders often prefer to have the prirnary obligor be the primary debtor. These 
types of considerations often mean that the parties cannot avoid a loan being 
made directly to the corporation. 
82Grojean v. Commissioner, 248 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001); Uri v. Commissioner, 949 
F.2d 371 (lOth Cir. 1991); Harris v. United States, 902 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1990); Brown v. 
Commissioner, 706 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1983); Estate of Leavitt v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 206 
(1988), affd, 875 F.2d 420 (4th Cir. 1989). Contra Selfe v. United States, 778 F.2d 769 (lIth 
Cir. 1985). The court in Se!fo held that debt-equity principles developed under subchapter C of 
the Code could be used in determining whether a corporate debt guaranteed by a shareholder 
could be characterized as a capital contribution. The case involved somewhat unusual facts in 
that the loan was originally made to the taxpayer and then converted to corporate loans when 
the taxpayer incorporated her business. The Eleventh Circuit ruled against the taxpayer in 
Sleiman v. Commissioner, 187 F.3d 1352 (I lth Cir. 1999). which involved more traditional 
facts (original loan to corporation. guaranteed by shareholders). The Sleiman court did not 
overrule Selft, however, and indeed seem to confirm its holding. 
For an example of how sloppy paperwork can be fatal see Bolding v. Commissioner. 70 
T.C.M. (CCH) 110, 1995 T.C.M. (RIA) ! 95.326 (A shareholder obtained a line of credit 
from a bank. Funds were disbursed from the line of credit directly to the S corporation at the 
shareholders direction. The Court held that the funds did not constitute a contribution to the 
equity of the corporation because. based on the taxpayer's testimony, the funds were included 
on the corporation's balance sheet as "Loans from Shareholders." The Tax Court. however, did 
not treat the funds as an indebtedness of the corporation to the shareholder either. because 
the court could not determine that the funds borrowed from the bank constituted part of the 
balance of the "Loans from Shareholders." The loans from the shareholder were not evidenced 
by promissory notes or clear book entries.). 
83I.R.C. § 1366(d). 
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 62, No.3 
764 SECTION OF TAXATION 
4. Section 754 Election 
Another substantial advantage of the partnership over the S corporation is 
the availability of the "section 754 election." Among the times a section 754 
election can be useful is when a partnership interest is purchased or inherited. 
If an election is made, the "inside basis" of the purchasing or inheriting part-
ner's share of partnership assets is increased or decreased to equal the outside 
basis of that partner's partnership interest.84 If the inside basis of a partner's 
share of partnership assets is "stepped up" as a result of the election, when 
the relevant assets of the partnership are sold, the purchasing or inheriting 
partner does not recognize gain to the extent of pre-acquisition appreciation. 
The partner also is able to use the higher inside basis for computing deprecia-
tion and other relevant deductions.85 What is good for the goose is good for 
the gander, and a section 754 election can result in a downward adjustment 
if: at the time the purchasing or inheriting partner acquires an interest, the 
assets of the partnership have a fair market value that is less than their bases.86 
If a partnership has partners regularly coming and going, section 754 elec-
tions can become a major accounting headache, though the computer age has 
reduced the pain. 
Generally, a section 754 election is just that, an election. Logically, one 
would make the election if it tneans an upward adjustment and not make it 
if it means a downward adjustment. Life is sometimes that good, but often 
is not. Once an election is made, it cannot be undone without the consent 
of the Service.87 If the partnership makes the election when a partnership 
interest is purchased when the good times are rolling, it is most likely stuck 
with it if a partnership interest is again purchased when the good times are no 
longer rolling. The Service will not permit an election to be revoked merely to 
avoid a downward adjustment.88 Further, a downward adjustment is manda-
tory if, at the time of the transfer of the partnership interest, the partnership's 
adjusted basis in the partnership property exceeds by more than $250,000 the 
fair market value of such property. 89 
Comparable adjustments to inside partnership bases are also possible when 
a partner recognizes a gain or loss on a partnership distribution to him. Again, 
a downward adjustment can be required in some cases where a loss is recog-
nized.90 
841 am putting in very sitnple terms rules that are highly complex. See I.R.C. §§ 743. 754. 
755; Reg. §§ 1.743-1 (b)-(d), 1.755-1. 
85Reg. § 1.743-1(b)-(d), (j). 
86See id. 
87Reg. § 1.754-1(c). 
88 Permission may be given if there has been a substantial change in the nature of the part-
nerships business, a substantial increase in the assets of the partnership, a change in the char-
acter of the partnership assets. or an increased frequency of retirernents or shifts of partnership 
interests. See Reg. § 1.754-1 (c). 
89LR.C. § 743(d). 
9°I.R.C. §§ 734(b). 754, 755; Reg. § 1.743(b), (c). 
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A section 754 election in many respects permits greater accuracy. When 
a taxpayer purchases an interest in an entity, he is ultimately looking at the 
value of the assets in that entity to determine what he should pay. Especially 
for a pass-through entity, being able to harmonize inside and outside basis 
ensures that the tax consequences of the investment mostly closely match the 
economics of the invescment. For example, if the partner buys the partnership 
interest when a given partnership asset is worch $100, and the partnership 
sells the asset for $100, the partner has no economic gain or loss. Without a 
section 754 election, however, the partner may be allocated tax gain or loss 
if the partnership's basis in that asset is other than $100. For this reason, 
among others. there have been suggestions that section 754 elections be ITlade 
mandatory across the board.91 Mandatory elections have been resisted in part 
because of the greater complexity they add to the system, but may gain new 
momentum if Subchapter S is repealed, permitting greater attention to be 
focused on Subchapter K. 
For all of its complexity, most tax advisors agree that the existence of the 
section 754 election is a good thing, at least for their clients. No analog to 
the section 754 election exists for an S corporation. Thus, upon buying or 
inheriting stock in an S corporation, the stockholder takes a basis in the stock 
equal to its fair market value as of the date of purchase or the decedenes date 
of death.92 He cannot adjust the inside basis of the S corporation's assets to 
equal the possibly higher outside basis of the corporate stock. Upon a sale of 
appreciated corporate assets, the shareholder is taxed on a proportionate share 
of the income, notwithstanding the fact that this income might increase the 
basis of his stock in excess of its fair ITlarket value. The shareholder might not 
be able to take advantage of the loss inherent in the stock until the stock is 
sold, which could be well into the future. Further, the shareholder's recognized 
loss on the stock normally is a capital loss whereas the gain on the sale of the 
relevant property may be ordinary income, resulting in a character distortion 
in addition to a timing distortion. Finally, if a shareholder dies before dispos-
ing of the stock, he takes his losses with him. The loss disappears because his 
heirs take a fair rn.arket value basis in the stock under section 1014. 
5. Compensation for Services 
Often some owners contribute the capital necessary to start the business, while 
others perforITl the services that will hopefully make the business successful. 
How should the service owners be compensated? Partners can hold two dif-
ferent types of partnership interests: A capital interest, entitling the recipient 
to an interest in the underlying capital of the partnership, or a profits interest, 
91 See GEORGE K. YIN & DAVID J. SHAKOW, TAXATION OF PRIVATE BUSINESS ENTERPRlSES 
371-77 (1999) [hereinafter ALI Report); Safe, Accountable, Flexible, and Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act of 2003, S. 1072, l08th Congo § 5683 (2003); Jurnpstart Our 
Business Strength OOBS) Act, S. 1637, 108th Congo § 469 (2004). 
92LR.C. §§ 1012, 1014(a). In the case ofinherited stock, the valuation date can sornetitnes 
be later than the dare of death. See LR.C. § 10 14(a). 
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entitling the recipient to share only in future profits of the partnership. The 
two types of interest are typically taxed differently. The fair lllarket value of 
a capital interest given in exchange for services is taxable to the recipient.93 
Rarely, however, is a capital interest exchanged for services, because, in effect, 
the "money partners" would be giving a share of their contributions to the 
service partner. It is more COflllllon for a service provider to receive a profits 
interest. Currently, in most circumstances, a profits interest is not taxable on 
receipt.94 I say currently, because the Service has proposed, and may soon 
finalize, regulations that at least technically will change this result.95 These 
Proposed Regulations provide that any partnership interest, profits or capital, 
is property.96 Outside the partnership context, it is long established law that 
the fair market value of property received in exchange for services is ordinary 
income, and the Proposed Regulations seek to illlplelllent this rule fully in 
the partnership context.97 Under most circumstances, however, the Proposed 
Regulations allow a partnership interest to be valued at its liquidation value.98 
If a true future profits interest is involved, its liquidation value is cotnmonly 
zero as the future profits have not yet been earned and cannot reliably be pre-
dicted. Thus, while there is a lot of smoke, there is often not going to be much 
fire. A service partner usually incurs no income on receipt of a profits interest 
now, and will also usually incur no incotne if the Proposed Regulations are 
finalized. Of course, when the partnership earns profits, the partner holding 
a profits interest includes his distributive share of those partnership profits in 
93I.R.C. § 83(a); Reg. § 1.721-1 (b)(l). Under section 83(a), the incidence of income is 
deferred if the partnership interest is subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. 
94Rev. Proc. 1993-27, 1993-2 C.B. 343. If a person. acting as a partner or in anticipation 
of becoming a parmer, provides services to or for the benefit of the partnership and receives a 
profit interest in return, the Service will not treat this transaction as taxable provided: 
1. the interest does not relate to a predictable stream of income; 
2. the partner does not dispose of the interest within two years; or 
3. the interest is not of a "publicly traded" limited partnership. 
95 See Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(1), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (2005). 
96See id. 
97 See I.R.C. § 83(a); Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3(e). 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (2005) (explicitly provid-
ing that "property" includes a partnership interest); Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 
U.S. 426 (1955); Int'l Freighting Corp. v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1943); see also 
New York State Bar Association Tax Section, Proposed Regs and Rev. Proc. on Partnership Equity 
Trans.forred in Connection w#h the Performance of Services. 109 TAX NOTES (TA) 1311 (2005); 
Marty McMahon. Recognition of Gain by a Partnership Issuing an Equity Interest for Services: The 
Proposed Regulations Get it Wrong, 109 TAX NOTES (TA) 1161 (2005). 
98See Proposed Regulation section 1.83-3(1), 70 Fed. Reg. 29,675 (2005), which provides 
for a safe harbor for when liquidation value may be used. and the related Proposed Revenue 
Procedure in Notice 2005-43, 2005-24 I.R.B. 1221. The Proposed Revenue Procedure pro-
vides that the safe harbor may be used when the partnership interest (including a profits inter-
est) received is not (1) related to a substantially certain and predictable stream of income from 
partnership assets. such as income from high-quality debt securities or a high-quality net lease, 
(2) transferred in anticipation of a subsequent disposition. or (3) an interest in a publicly traded 
partnership within the meaning of section 7704(b). See Notice 2005-43. 2005-24 I.R.B. 1221. 
These are very similar to the rwes of Revenue Procedure 1993-27. 1993-24 I.R.B. 63. 
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income under section 702. 
While this Article is not the place to engage fully the "carried interest 
debate," it should be noted that this advantage of partnerships has at times 
engendered controversy. The service provider usually has the sam.e ordinary 
income tax consequence in the partnership context that she has outside the 
partnership context.99 The service provider receiving nonpartnership property 
for services has ordinary incorn.e equal to the fair market value of the property 
received. The profits earned and allocated to the service provider-partner are 
also ordinary income-well there is the rub; that is usually the case, but not 
always. If the service provider is running a private equity fund, and the profits 
generated by the fund are from the sale of, say, capital assets held for over one 
year, the fund's profits consist of long term capital gains taxed at a 150/0 rate 
rather than ordinary income taxed at (maximally) a 35% rate. 100 The fact that 
fund managers may be compensated for their services with 15% rather than 
350/0 dollars has caused more than a little consternation in Congress, and the 
House passed a bill that would have changed this outcome, though it was 
never ultimately enacted. 101 Whatever the result of the carried interest debate, 
the underlying rule for profits interest is unlikely to be changed dramatically 
outside the private equity fund arena, and indeed it is not readily change-
able. The uncertainty of future profits usually means a future profits interest 
is valued at zero. 102 Thus, overall, this advantage for partnerships likely has a 
bright future. 
In the S corporation universe, on the other hand, there is only one type 
of ownership interest that can be given a service provider: stock. 103 The fair 
market value of an unrestricted stock interest is incom.e to the recipient, no 
99The timing of when the ordinary income is recognized can, however. be very different. 
IOOSU I.R.C. § 1. 
IOITo AInend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to Extend Certain Expiring Provisions, 
and for other Purposes, H.R. 3996, 110th Congo (2007); see Chris Sanchirico, Taxing Carry: 
]he Problematic Analogy to «Sweat Equity.» 117 TAX NOTES (TA) 239 (2007); Michael L. Schler, 
Taxing Partnership Profits Interests as Compensation Income. 119 TAX NOTES (TA) 829 (2008); 
Michael S. Knoll, ]he Taxation of Private EqUity Carried Interests: Estimating the Revenue Efficts 
of Taxing Profit Interests as Ordinary Income, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 115. 117-18 (2008); 
Henry Ordower, Demystifying Hedge Funds: A Design Primer, 7 U .C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 323 
(2007); David A. Weisbach, Professor Says Carried Interest Legislation Is Misguided, 2007 TAX 
NOTES TODAY 505 (2007). 
For earlier but still relevant articles see Mark P. Gergen, Reforming Subchapter K: Compensating 
Service Partners, 48 TAX L. REv. 69 (1992) (in which Professor Gergen recommends treating 
the compensatory allocations to a partner as ordinary salary income). For a trio of related 
articles discussing this issue (the latter two commenting on the first and adding their perspec-
tive) see Laura E. Cunningham. Taxing Partnership Interests Exchanged for Services. 47 TAX L. 
REv. 247 (I 992); W. Lesse Casdeberry, Commentary: Carnpbell-A Simpler Solution. 47 TAX L 
REv. 277 (1992); and Leo L. Schmolka. Commentary Taxing Partnership Interests Exchangedfor 
Services: Let DiarnondlCampbell Quietly Die, 47 TAX L. REv. 287 (1992). 
l02See St. John v. United States, 84-1 U.S.T.C, 9158. 53 A.F.T.R.2d 84-718.84-721 (C.D. 
IlL 1983). 
J03See LR.C. § 1361 (b)(l); see also Reg. § 1361-1. 
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ifs, ands, or buts about it. 104 Note that the S corporation service provider is 
given the equivalent of a partnership capital interest. If the S corporation is 
liquidated the day after the service provider is given an unrestricted stock 
interest, she receives a share of the S corporation's assets, even if they were 
contributed by others. Thus, the unrestricted stock received always has cur-
rent value, something that is not necessarily the case for a partnership profits 
interest. 
B. Advantages of S Corporations over Partnerships 
1. Background 
Before beginning this discussion, I should mention an advantage that S corpo-
rations once had, but no longer do. Indeed, this advantage was so significant, 
it might have alone justified keeping Subchapter S alive. Before the advent of 
LLCs, S corporations were a good solution for the "Mom and Pop" business. 
Pre-LLCs, the only way to give the business a liability shield and the benefits 
of partnership taxation was to form a limited partnership with a corporate 
general partner. Mom and Pop could have been the limited partners as well 
as the officers and directors of the corporate general partners. But, this meant 
that Mom and Pop had to manage two entities, and be careful not t:o engage 
in m.anagefllent activities when they had their lifllited partner hat on; doing 
otherwise could lead to personal liability. 105 Mom and Pop usually could not 
be trusted to keep things straight so many advisors put them in an S corpo-
ration. It was a second best, but safer choice. 106 But now Morn and Pop can 
use an LLC and have the benefits of partnership taxation, while operating 
out of a single entity that in most states is less burdensome to keep straight 
than a corporation. 107 Further, in these closely held entities, the complexities 
of Subchapter K are mostly held in abeyance, so that the LLC also is a fairly 
simple entity for tax purposes.I08 
Numerous changes have been made to Subchapter S to make it Illore 
appealing. As I noted above, it may now have up to 100 shareholders. Section 
501 (c) (3) organizations, pension plans, and family trusts may now be share-
holders. An S corporation can own a QSSS and own stock in C corpora-
tions. 109 But few are benefitted by these changes. Over 880/0 of S corporations 
l04I.R.C. § 83(a) (stating that the incidence ofincome is deferred in the stock interest sub-
ject to a substantial risk of forfeiture). 
105In the interim, the rules for limited partner participation have been liberalized in many 
states. See UniE Ltd. P'ship Act § 303 (2001). 
I06See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 17, , 1.01. 
107See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 17 , , 3.08. 
108For example, special allocations may not be needed and section 754 elections are likely 
rare. See supra text accompanying notes 73-78, 84-92. 
109 See supra text accompanying notes 56-61. 
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have two or fewer shareholders~ almost always individuals. 11o These changes 
thus benefit a sITlall number of S corporations. The 100 shareholder rule is 
primarily valuable in S corporations where trusts own stock and an extended 
faITl.ily is the beneficiary of the trusts. III 
The advantages of partnerships, in contrast, benefit the "everyday" LLC as 
well as the sophisticated model. MeITlbers of everyday LLCs make contribu-
tions of property to the LLC and receive distributions from it. These transac-
tions are nonnally tax: free under sections 721 and 731. While perhaps not 
a majority, a large nUITlber of LLCs make special allocations of income and 
loss to its tnembers. Most entities, including everyday LLCs, have debt. Only 
in a partnership-type vehicle, such as an LLC, is section 752(a) available to 
permit owner-level bases to be increased by entity-level debt. Sales of owner-
ship interests are cotnITlon for all types of businesses, and owners of even the 
smallest business cannot avoid the grim reaper. Yet only a person buying or 
inheriting a partnership interest can receive an inside basis adjusttnent if an 
election under section 754 is in effect. Further, these considerations tend to 
drive the choice of entity decision. 
But all that said there are a few circutnstances when S corporations have 
the upper hand, though of relatively less iITlportance and relatively few in 
number. As I discuss in detail below, these advantages do not provide ade-
quate justification for the entire S corporation edifice. Those advantages that 
are legititnate should be incorporated into Subchapter K, those that are not 
should be abandoned. 
2. Corporate Pathways 
Sotne of the advantages that an S corporation has over a partnership have 
to do not with the S corporation taxation regiITle as such, but with the fact 
that an S corporation is just that, a corporation. SOnletitnes it is good to be a 
corporation. SOnle examples follow. 
a. Going Public. While publicly traded partnerships and even publicly 
traded LLCs exist, the overwheltning nlajority of publicly traded entities 
are C corporations. 112 Thus. a business that wants to tnake a public offering 
usually needs to find its way into a C corporation. This process is quite a 
straightforward matter for an S corporation. An S corporation lTlay terminate 
its S election with a tnajorhy vote of its shareholders.l13 Thereafter, it is a C 
110 As of 2004. See INTERNAL REvENUE SERVICE. SOl TAX STATS - S CORPORATIONS, at tbI. 6 
(2004) [hereinafter SOl TAX STATS]. available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soil04coI120s06. 
xIs (last visited Apr. 2. 2009). 
III LR.C. § 1361 (c)(2)(B)(iii), (iv) (stating that family members can be treated as one share-
holder. making the effective number of permitted shareholders theoretically vast); see I.RC. § 
1361(c)(I)(A), (B); see also EUSTICE & KUNTZ, supra note 59.! 3.04; Schiff Harden, LLP, TAX 
UPDATE (Oct. 22,2004), http://www.schiffhardin.com/binary/tax_l02204.pdf. 
1I2BISHOP & KLEINBERGER, supra note 17, , 16.01. 
1l3I.R.C. § 1362(d)(1)(b) (stating that a final S corporation return must be filed). 
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corporation and the public offering of the stock can proceed. 114 
For a partnership, matters are more complex. There are two main options. 115 
In "Option One,>' the partnership contributes its assets to the corporation in 
exchange for stock. The partnership then liquidates and distributes the stock 
to its partners. In "Option Two," the partners contribute their partnership 
interests to the corporation in exchange for stock, liquidating the partner-
ship as a matter of law, because a single owner-to wit, the corporation-
rernains. 116 
The potential problem lies not with the liquidation of the partnership, but 
with the incorporation. The liquidation of the partnership is typically, and 
usually straight forwardly, tax free under sections 731. The incorporation 
will be tax free to the corporation under section 1032, but for it to be tax 
free to the contributing shareholders, it must fall within section 351 (a). As 
I discussed above, section 351 (a) provides that a contribution of property to 
a corporation is tax free if the contributing parties receive only stock in the 
exchange and are in 80% control of the corporation "immediately after the 
transfer." 117 
Does section 351 (a) apply to Options One and Two? The critical issue is 
whether the contributing shareholders have 80% control "immediately after" 
the property is contributed in exchange for stock. In Option Two, the answer 
is clearly yes as the stock goes directly to the partners. In Option One, where 
the stock first goes to the partnership and then to the partners, the concern 
is whether the partnership's ownership of the stock is so transitory that it 
prevents the section 351 (a) requirements from being rnet. In Revenue Ruling 
114Corporations do not recognize gain or loss on the receipt of property in exchange for 
stock. LR C. § 1032. If the purchasers buying the stock pay with cash, as is typical, there is no 
gain or loss to them either. Thus. section 351 is not needed. See Benjamin G. Wells. Planning 
for rhe Special Tax Problems 1hat Arise in Taking an S Corporation Public. 80 J. TAX'N 164 
(1994); see also Victor Fleischer, Rational Exuberance of Structuring l-i-nture Capital Start-ups. 
57 TAX L. REv. 137 (2003); Daniel S. Goldberg. Choice of Entity for a venture Capital Start-Up: 
The Myth of Incorporation, 55 TAX LAw. 923 (2002); Joseph Bankman, Structure of Silicon Valley 
Start-Ups, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1737 (1994). 
115 A third approach is for the partnership to liquidate and distribute its assets to the part-
ners, who could then contribute them t:o the corporation. The mechanics of this approach 
are more problematic. Two sets of state transfer taxes could apply, for example, one on the 
partnership's distribution to the shareholders and another on the partners' contribution to 
the corporation. Further, if there is an actual or deemed distribution of money to a partner in 
excess of his basis in his partnership interest, he would have to recognize gain under section 
731(a)(l) to the extent of the excess. In addition, if the transfers to the corporation were not 
done contemporaneously with the liquidation of the partnership (admittedly quite unlikely), 
there would be the risk that a given partner might not be willing to contribute a particular 
property, or might: have sold it, etc. Even if these problems did not exist. it is hard so see why 
one would not prefer Options One or Two. 
116Unif. P'Ship Act § 101 (6) (1997) (defining a partnership as an association of two or more 
persons). 
117Section 368(c) defines control to mean ownership of stock possessing at least 800/0 of the 
total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote and at least 80% of the total 
number of shares of all other classes of stock of the corporation. 
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1984-111, however, the Service ruled that where, as in Option One, there is a 
contribution of property by the partnership to the corporation followed by a 
liquidation of the partnership, the requirements of section 3S 1 (a) are met. I IS 
In effect, the Ruling ignores the fact that the partnership's ownership of the 
stock is brief 
Does the answer change if a public offering follows the incorporation? 
Revenue Ruling 1984-111 does not address this question. The issue is whether 
the shareholders obtaining stock from the public offering have to be counted 
for purposes of the 800/0 control test, and if so, when they are counted. If the 
contribution to the corporation by the partners or the partnership is treated 
as fully separate from the public offering, rhere is no problem because there 
is 1000/0 control immediately after the original formation of the corporation. 
If the contributions to the corporation by rhe partners or the partnership 
and the contributions by the participanrs in rhe public offering are treated 
as a single transaction, there is still no problem because the contributors also 
have 1000/0 control immediately after the contribution. However, if section 
3S 1 defines the control group as both the partners or the partnership and 
the public purchasers~ and if the partners or partnership are considered to 
make their contributions at different tiInes, section 3S 1 does not apply to any 
contributor. 119 
To complicate this complex situation further, there are two possible sce-
narios. One is where, prior to incorporation, the partners and the partner-
ship have no agreement with an underwriter to make a public offering of the 
stock. The other scenario is just the opposite, where the partners do have that 
agreement. Typically, the partners will prefer the latter scenario. Once incor-
porated as a C corporation, the corporation and the owners may have to incur 
two levels of taxation to get back to a partnership. 120 Thus, if the primary rea-
son for incorporating is to go public, the partners want to be sure the public 
offering is going to happen before tripping the incorporation domino. 
11 8 See Rev. Rul. 1984-111. 1984-2 C.B. 88 (revoking Rev. RuL 1970-239. 1970 C.B. 74. 
which carne to the same conclusion with regard to the section 351(a) issue). Revenue Ruling 
1970-239 held that the tax consequences of all three scenarios were the sarn.e. Revenue Ruling 
1984-111 revokes that holding. concluding that the tax consequences of the different options 
can vary. Assuming § 351 (a) applies. then in the case of Option One, the partnership takes 
the same basis in the stock that it had in the contributed property under § 358(a). Then the 
partnership liquidation rules kick in. Generally. the distributee partners will allocate their bases 
in the partnership interest to the Stock. See I.R.C. § 732. In the case of Option Two, under 
§ 358(a). the erstwhile partners take as their bases in the stock. the bases they had in the 
contributed partnership interests. I should perhaps note that there is no question here that the 
parties are contributing "property" to the corporation. one of the requirements of § 351 (a). 
Contributions of services will not generally count. See BrrrKER & EUSTICE. supra note 10, 
,3.02(2]. 
119It would be highly unusual for less than 20% of the stock to be sold in a public offering. 
Normally, participants in a public offering are contributing cash to the corporation. so for 
them no gain recognition exists. Under section 1032, there is also no income to the corpora-
tion. 
120 See supra text accompanying notes 25-26. 
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If the agree.ment is reached with the underwriter after incorporation, the 
control test of section 351 (a) is most likely met. The contribution by the 
partners or partnership is most likely seen as wholly separate from the public 
offering. Current case law generally looks to whether there is a binding obliga-
tion made before incorporation by the shareholders to dispose of the stock. 121 
If so, the stock that is the subject of that agreement cannot be counted toward 
the 800/0 control test. If there is no such agreement, all of the stock that is 
received can be counted toward the 800/0 test. The Tax Court summarizes the 
law as follows: 
A detennination of "ownership." as that term is used in section 368(c) and 
for purposes of control under section 351, depends upon the obligations 
and freedom of action of the transferee with respect to the stock when he 
acquired it from the corporation. Such traditional ownership attributes as 
legal title. voting rights, and possession of stock certificates are not conclu-
sive. If the transferee, as part of the transaction by which the shares were 
acquired, has irrevocably foregone or relinquished at that time the legal 
right to determine whether to keep the shares, ownership in such shares is 
lacking for purposes of section 35 L By contrast" if there are no restrictions 
upon freedom of action at the time he acquired the shares. it is immaterial 
how soon thereafter the transferee elects to dispose of his stock or whether 
such disposition is in accord with a preconceived plan not amounting to a 
binding obligation. 122 
121 See, e.g .• Intermountain Lumber v. Commissioner, 65 TC. 1025, 1031-32 (1976). 
122Id at 1031-32 (emphasis supplied); see BrCTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10, ,. 3.09[2] 
(also containing this quote). It is sometimes also said that even without a binding obligation, 
the taxpayer fails to comply with section 351 if the loss of concrol is both part of a precon-
ceived plan and a sine qua not thereof BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10, ,. 3.09[2]. The 
anti-taxpayer authority for this, however, is rather thin. There is one case, west Coast Marketing 
Corp. v. Commissioner, 46 TC. 32 (1966), in which an exchange of the shares received in the 
incorporation in a purported B reorganization was imminent, but no binding agreement to 
make the exchange was in effect. The Tax Court held that section 351 (a) did not apply to the 
incorporation, notwithstanding the lack of a binding agreement to exchange (he shares, in part 
because the incorporation lacked a business purpose. Id. at 40. west Coast is inconsistent with 
the Tax Court'S later holding in Intermountain. As both are Tax Court cases, the later holding 
of Intermountain should be controlling. The other contrary authority is the hoary Revenue 
Ruling 1954-96, 1954-1 C.B. 11 L which, of course, is not binding on the judiciary. Further, 
the rrend of the Service's rulings is pro-taxpayer. Recently, the Service ruled that the section 
351 (a) requirements were met even where there was a binding obligation to transfer the stock 
received in the section 351 transaction, where there was an alternative tax free, section 351 (a) 
way of structuring the transaction. See Rev. RuL 2003-51,2003-21 LR.B. 938. Finally, there is 
some support in the Regulations for the Tax Court's holding in Intermountain. Reg. § 1.351-
l(a)(l) ("[I]mmediateo/ after the exchange does not necessarily require simultaneous exchanges 
by two or more persons, but comprehends a situation where the rights of the parties have been 
previouso/ defined and the execution of the agreement proceeds with an expedition consistent 
with orderly procedure.") (emphasis supplied). The language about the rights of the parties 
having been "previously defined" is consistent with the binding agreement approach. I found 
no circuit court decisions inconsistent with the binding agreement test in the section 351 
context. Indeed. the Tax Court cites a number of circuit courts in support of its decision in 
Intermountain. See Intermountain Lumber, 65 TC. at 1032. That said, a given appel1ate court 
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An obligation to dispose of stock could be interpreted to include new stock 
to be issued by the corporation. But there is no such binding obligation to 
issue additional stock if the agreement with the underwriter is made after 
incorporation. Thus on incorporation of the partnership the requirements of 
section 351 (a) should be met. It is conceivable a court could disagree with 
the Tax Court's analysis, but that has not happened since the case carne out 
in 1976, over 30 years ago. 
And if there is such a binding obligation with the underwriter before 
incorporation? The Service historically has taken a pro-taxpayer approach. 123 
The Treasury and the Service solidified their views (if perhaps not the 
clarity with which they were expressed) in Treasury Regulation section 
1.3S1-1(a)(3) in 1996. It provides that if a person acquires stock from an 
underwriter in exchange for cash in a qualified underwriting transaction, 
that person is treated as transferring the cash directly to the corporation in 
exchange for stock. 124 Further, the Regulations also provide that in determin-
ing whether the 800/0 test is met, siInultaneity is not required, "but corn.pre-
hends a situation where the rights of the parties have been previously defined 
and the execution of the agreement proceeds with an expedition consistent 
with orderly procedure."125 Finally, the preamble to Treasury Regulation sec-
tion 1.351-1 (a) (3) provides: 
[A]lthough the regulations specifically concern underwriting. it is intended 
that its principles could apply equally in factually analogous situations. For 
example. if the ownership by other intermediaries in the distribution of 
stock ... , such as broker-dealers, is transitory, that ownership should also 
be disregarded. 126 
Reading these provisions together along with Revenue Ruling 1984-111, 
it seems clear that the incorporation of the partnership under either Option 
One or Two, coupled with a public offering of the underlying stock, falls 
within section 351 (a), even if there is a binding obligation to make the public 
offering prior to incorporation. To summarize: (1) the transfers by the part-
ners or the partnership to the corporation and the transfers of the ITloneys 
to the corporation from the public offering do not need to be simultaneous, 
(2) in Option One, the transience of the partnership's ownership is effec-
tively ignored, and (3) the transfers from the public offering are deemed to 
go directly to the corporation, even if the underwriter is a way station. Thus, 
could apply the step transaction doctrine in a way that prevents section 351 (a) from applying 
if there was a preconceived plan as suggested in BITrKER & EUSTICE. supra note 10, even if 
there was no binding agreement. See also Ronald H. Jensen. Of Form and Substance: Tax-Free 
Incorporations and Other Transactions Under Section 351, 11 VA. TAX REv. 349 (1991). 
123See Rev. Rul. 1978-294. 1978-2 C.B. 141, superseded by Reg. § 1.351-1 (a)(3). 
124 Reg. § 1.351-1 (a)(3). A qualified underwriting transaction is a transaction in which a 
corporation issues stock for cash in an underwriting in which either the underwriter is an agent 
of the corporation or the underwriter's ownership of the stock in transitory. 
125 Reg. § 1.351-1 (a) (1 ). 
126T.D. 8665. 1996-1 C.B. 35 (emphasis supplied). 
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assum.ing the public offering occurs promptly after incorporation, both the 
partner contributors and the public offering contributors should be seen as 
part of one group, and, of course, that group has control of the corporation 
once the sm.oke clears. 127 Thus, the taxpayers will not be denied the benefits 
of section 351 (a).l2S 
While there are few federal income tax hurdles to a partnership incorporat-
ing and making a public offering of the stock, there m.ay be state law hurdles. 
State and local transfer taxes as well as transfer consents from m.ortgagors, 
landlords, etc. could be issues for an incorporating partnership.129 Typically, 
they are not issues on the conversion of an S corporation into a C corpora-
tion, because from a nontax: perspective there has been no change. The same 
state law entity, to wit, the corporation, exists both before and after its con-
version, subject to a different type of federal incom.e tax treatment. 
The public offering arena is one in which the S corporation has som.e 
advantages, though if there are few or no state law hurdles, the disadvantages 
of the partnership form. are likely not substantial. Getting to the public offer-
ing frofll. a partnership form Inay involve more hassle than getting to it from 
an S corporation form, but often the hassle is worth it. Much may depend on 
how soon the public offering is planned (recalling that more businesses plan 
to go public than actually go public). If tnany years m.ay go by between the 
127 If there is a dramatic delay in the public offering, and there was a pre-incorporation bind-
ing obligation to do the public offering. it could prove awkward. On the one hand, the binding 
agreement makes it hard to ignore the public shareholders. on the other hand, a long delay 
makes it harder to say there was control by the public and nonpublic shareholders "immedi-
atelyafter" the exchange. I did not corne across a case on point, but the Regulations suggest 
the Service would take a liberal approach. See Reg. § 1.351-1 (a) (I), (3). 
128 See Goldberg, supra note 114, at 927-929. Those joys will be tempered. however, if the 
liabilities of the partnership are greater than the partnership's bases in its contributed assets 
(Option One), or if the liabilities allocated to partners are greater than the partners' bases 
in their contributed partnership interests (Option Two). In that event. and to that extent, 
gain will be recognized under section 357(c). Note that gain on incorporation will generally 
be a consequence of prior deductions which reduced the bases of the assets and partnership 
interests. Given the time value of money, the deductions will generally be more pleasurable 
than the gains are painful. Section 357(c) trumps section 351(a), providing an exception to 
the general rule of nonrecognition. LR.C. § 357(c). Gain must be recognized to the extent 
the liabilities of a transferor exceed the transferor's basis in the contributed assets. I.R.C. § 
375(c). Operating in parallel, section 752(b) would effectively allocate the gain among the 
partners. LR.C. § 752(b). Section 752(b) provides that if a partner is relieved ofliabilities. that 
is treated as a distribution of money to the partner. I.R.C. § 752(b) Section 731(a)(l) in turn 
provides that if a distribution of money exceeds a partner's basis in her partnership interest, 
gain is recognized. I.R.C. § 731 (a)(l). The gains may be ordinary or capital gains. The gain is 
generally allocated among the assets based on their relative fair market values, and the character 
of the gain is generally a function of the type of appreciated assets contributed. See Rev. Rul. 
1968-55. 1968-1 C.B. 140. Some tax arbitrage is possible here. Depreciation on real estate 
reduces ordinary income. where as the gain, if the property is held over one year, is long-term 
capital gain taxed. generally, at a 25% rate up to the depreciation taken, and 15% thereafter. 
See I.R.C. § l(h)(C), (D). 
129See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 13-201 et seq. (LexisNexis 2007). 
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original for.mation and the public offering, the tax advantages of a, partner-
ship in the interim often outweigh the cumbersomeness of going public. On 
the other hand, if a public offering is expected to occur in the near ter.m, a 
partnership may not be worth the bother. An S corporation may make more 
sense. It still permits the flow through of losses to the stockholders, provided 
the stockholders have sufficient stock bases to allow for the deduction of the 
10sses.130 Note that such "start-ups," particularly in the nanotech, biotech, 
and information technology arenas, commonly operate at a loss for a nUlTlber 
of years. 
Venture capitalist funds commonly have a generic preference for the corpo-
rate form. While the use of an S corporation would permit a venture capital 
fund to participate in losses, unlike the individual investor, its interest in tax 
losses is often limited. When the venture capitalist fund invests in a com-
pany, its principal concern is the exit strategy. Usually this is a public offer-
ing, though, as I discuss below, it can also include an effort to position the 
company for a takeover. If the venture capital fund holds common stock. it 
will want to be able to force the corporation to register the shares at the time 
of the "initial public offering" or ~'IPO." 
Often, however, the venture capital fund does not want comfllon stock at 
the tilTle of investment (pre-IPO), but preferred stock that has preferential 
liquidation and redemption rights, and possibly preferential dividends. If the 
venture capital fund needs to receive preferred stock. the S corporation form 
is unavailable because S corporations are only pennitted to have one class of 
stoCk. 131 The venture capital fund usually also wants an ironclad right to con-
vert this preferred stock into common, and have the right at the time of the 
public offering to have that common stock registered. 
If an LLC or other tax partnership is used instead of a corporation, the doc-
UITIents are much Illore challenging t:o draft as the parties have to find a way to 
obligate a yet-to-be-formed corporation to issue common stock, and register 
that comlllon stock for public trading, on some sort of fixed conversion basis 
with the Illembership units of the existing LLC. Further complicating matters 
is the fact that in ITIany cases there is not sifllply one venture capital financing 
round, but many. It is much easier to create a new series of preferred stock for 
each financing round than create legally reliable series of special me.mbership 
interests in LLCs. All this can m.ake LLCs not worth the trouble, particularly 
when the venture capital funds are far .more interested in obtaining a big pay 
day at the end of the road rather than near-term tax benefits. If the venture is 
unsuccessful, venture capital funds can still receive a section 165 loss deduc-
tion on their investment. Indeed, some venture capital funds, when they find 
a company that they really like that is currently an LLC, require that it be 
130I.R.C. § 1366(d) (5 corporation shareholders are also allowed to deduct losses to the 
extent of any debt owed them by the corporation). 
l3tl.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D). Differences in voting rights are pennitted. I.R.C. § 1361(C) 
(4). 
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converted over to a C corporation before they invest. 132 
While I discuss ways below to smooth the conversion of LLCs and other 
tax partnerships into corporations,. there are limits. LLCs and tax partner-
ships do not fit every business model. SometiInes only a corporation will do. 
While the world can live without S corporations, it cannot live without the 
corporate form altogether. 
b. ESOPs. Qualified pension trusts and section 501 (c)(3) charitable orga-
nizations are permissible S corporation shareholders.133 Qualified pension 
trusts and section 501 (c)(3) organizations are generally tax exempt. 134 I will 
therefore call them tax-exempt organizations, though this descriptor is not 
fully apt, as I will discuss below. An employee stock option plan (ESOP),. a 
type of pension trust, provides a good example of the benefit of the corporate 
fonn to this class of shareholders, and I will focus on ESOPs in this discus-
sion. 135 
To abbreviate in the extrem.e, an ESOP is a qualified pension plan that a 
corporation adopts. 136 Among an ESOP's purposes is to give the corporation's 
employees an equity interest in the corporation. The funds contributed to 
the ESOP by the corporation are generally tax deductible. 137 The stock in the 
corporation purchased by the ESOP is held in trust, and the corporation's 
employees are beneficiaries of the trust. 138 
ESOPs are often designed to be cooperative purchasers of the stock of own-
ers of closely held corporations. 139 Assum.e a corporation has a single share-
holder who is also the CEO. The CEO is ready to sell her interest, but cannot 
obtain an offer for the stock she feels will pay her full value. Instead, she has 
the corporation form an ESOP. She sells her stock at full value to the ESOP. 
Com.filonly, the ESOP borrows the money for the purchase from a bank. 140 
The corporation makes periodic, tax deductible contributions to the ESOP so 
132The reader will note the complete absence of footnotes for the above discussion. There 
apparently is little citable authority in this area. lowe my own understanding of this area to 
conversations with Professor Sean M. O'Connor of the University of Washington School of 
Law, an expert in the venture capital arena. 
133LR.C. § 1361 (b) (l)(B), (c) (6); see also I.RC. § 401(a). 
B41.RC. § 50I(a). 
135 Another reason for the coverage: I have been told informally, that in Congressional cir-
cles, some are defending S corporations due to their value to ESOPs. 
136 A "qualified" pLan is one to which contributions within certain limits are generally deduct-
ible and the income of which is generally tax exempt. These are subject to rules that liITlit dis-
crimination in favor of highly compensated employees. See I.RC. §§ 401 (a), 404, 501(a). 
137 See I.R.C. § 404(a)(3). (a)(9)(A). 
138See LR.C. §§ 401. 4975(e)(7); see also Uses ofESOPs, 354 TAX MNGT. PORT. (BNA) A-I, 
-2 (2005) [hereinafter BNA]. In the words of Senator Long: E50Ps will "ensure that tomor-
row's free enterprise system is financed so as to be more broadly owned." 129 Congo Rec. 
533,822 (daily ed. Nov. 17, 1983) (statement of Sen. Long). 
139The following is based on a conversation I had with Henry Smith. a pension plan expert. 
See also BNA, supra note 138. at A-I. 
14°See I.R.C. § 4975(d)(3). 
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that the ESOP can rnake payments on its indebtedness with the bank. 141 As 
these contributions are rnade, the corporation's ernployees are given equitable 
interests in the stock held by the ESOp' 142 If an employee retires. the ESOP 
is obligated to buy back his interest in the stock for fair market value unless 
it is traded on an established exchange. though the employee can demand to 
be given t:he stoCk. 143 If it works, ESOPs can be a win-win-win situation. The 
business owner receives full value for her business. As the contributions to 
the ESOP are tax deductible, the debt payment:s can be made, in effect, with 
pretax dollars. And the employees are provided with pension benefits and a 
participation in t:he business. 144 
ESOPs are not all that common for two reasons. First, it: can be difficult to 
find a bank that will make the loan. Second, the funds for the ESOP's pur-
chase of the stock ultirnately have to corne from the corporation, and often it 
does not want to take on this financial burden. 14s 
To prevent tax-exempt organizations frorn destroying the tax base, Congress 
provides that "unrelated business taxable inco.me" (UBTI) is taxed to mefll 
currently.146 UBTI is incorne from a trade or business that is regularly car-
ried on and is substantially unrelated to the tax-exempt organization's exempt 
functions. 147 Passive income, including dividends and gains on the sale of 
stock. is generally not UBTI. 148 It is thus normally safe for a tax-exempt orga-
nization to own stock in a C corporation, since the tax-exempt earnings will 
corne in the form of dividends and stock gains. 149 A tax-exempt organization's 
share of the income of an S corporation, on the other hand, is UBTI. 150 (The 
same is true for its share of income of a partnership. lSI) But, the Code would 
141 See I.R.C. § 404(a)(3), (a)(9)(A). 
142See LR.C. § 4975(e)(7). 
143I.R.C. § 409(h). (0). 
144 Of course, in the case of Enron, it was lose-lose-lose. See Martin A. Sullivan, ?he Flawed 
Economics of ESOPs and Employee Stock Options, 95 TAX NOTES (TA) 149 (2002); see also 
LR.C. § 401(a)(28), (a)(35) (diversification rules). 
145While ESOPs are permissible S corporation shareholders, it may make more sense to con-
vert the S corporation to a C corporation before the stock sale to the ESOP is consummated. 
If the owner sells C corporation srock to the ESOp' she recognizes no gain to the extent she 
invests the proceeds in other qualifying C corporation stock (typically publicly traded securi-
ties). See I.R.C. § 1042. 
146I.R.C. §§ 511, 512. "The problem at which the tax on unrelated business income is 
directed is primarily that of unfair competition. The tax-free status of ... organizations enable 
them to use their profit tax free to expand operations, while their competitors can expand only 
with profits remaining after taxes." Rep. No. 2375. 8Ist Cong .• 2d Sess. 28, 1950-2 C.B. 483. 
504. 
147I.R.C. § 513; see St. Luke's Hos. ofKan. City v. United States, 494 F. Supp. 85 (1980); 
Rev. Rul. 1985-109, 1985-2 C.B. 165. 
148I.R.C. § 5I2(b)(l). (b)(5). Note that the business income ultimately responsible for the 
dividends and stock gains is generally fully taxable. 
149To avoid UBTI. the organization cannot control the corporation. I.RC. § 512(b)(13). 
15°I.R.C. § 512(e)(l). 
151 LR.C. § 512(c). 
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not be the Code if the exception did not itself have an exception. And that is 
the case here. If an ESOP is the shareholder of an S corporation, its share of 
the incoITle of an S corporation is not UBTI. 152 There is no tax at any level on 
an S corporation owned entirely by an ESOP, m.aking ESOPs an interesting 
option for S corporations. 
Can an ESOP systeITl be created for partnerships? While theoretically pos-
sible~ it would be very difficult and highly cotnplex to achieve in practice. 
Unlike corporations, partners generally must keep capital accounts. Capital 
accounts can he thought of as a measure of the econoll'lic value of a part-
nership interest, though at tiInes they can be a highly ill'lprecise m.easure. 153 
Keeping capital accounts in proper form for ESOPs or their beneficiaries, 
with the stock holdings changing and beneficiaries coming and going, would 
be very challenging. The Service has issued proposed regulations on "regular" 
options to buy partnership interests.154 The American Bar Association Tax 
Section made suggestions both before and after the Proposed Regulations 
were issued. 155 While the reader will he happy to hear that detailing these 
efforts is beyond the scope of this article, I will note that I participated in the 
ABA's part of the process and watched a lot of very smart people destroy a 
lot of brain cells trying to get to the right answer. Adapting ESOPs to part-
nerships is not necessary. The solution is straight-forward. Once the ESOP 
becoITles appropriate, the partnership can incorporate. There should be no 
binding agreement in effect to create the ESOP before incorporation, less the 
stock being sold to the ESOP not be counted for purposes of the 800/0 control 
test. 156 Such a binding agreement is typically not needed. A small number of 
shareholders are usually in control and thus need not doubt that the corpora-
tion, once formed, will adopt the ESOP, which can then buy the stock. 
c. Takeovers. S corporations, and C corporations for that matter, can be 
popular if the business's owners want ultimately to be the target of a takeover 
by a publicly held corporation. As noted above:> venture capital funds often 
152I.R.C. § 512(e)(3). 
153 A partner's capital account is increased by the money and fair market value of property 
contributed by that partner as well as income and gain allocated to the partner. A partner's 
capital account is decreased by the money and fair market value of property distributed to the 
partner. allocations to the partner that are not deductible and not capitalized. and allocations 
to the partner of loss and deduction. See Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b). Capital accounts playa 
vital role in the economic effect test of Regulation § 1.704-1 (b)(2)(ii). See ARTHUR B. WILLIS, 
JOHN S. PENNELL, & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION,. 10.03 (6th ed. 1997) 
[hereinafter WILLIS]. 
lS4See Prop. Reg. § 1.704-1,68 Fed. Reg. 2930 (2003); Prop. Reg. § 1.83-3, 70 Fed. Reg. 
29,675 (2005). 
lS5See ABA COInments in Response to Notice 2000-29. 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY 45-19, 
Oan. 30, 2002); ABA Comments in Response to Prop. Reg. 103580-02, 2003 TAX NOTES 
TODAY 213-21 (Oct. 9. 2003); Karen Burke. Taxing Partnership Options, 100 TAX NOTES (TA) 
1569 (2003); Walter Schwidetzky. The Proposed Regulations on Noncompensatory Options, A 
Light at the End of the Tunnel. 21 J. TAX'N OF INY. 155 (2004). 
156See supra text accompanying notes 122-123. 
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have a takeover as their exit strategy. Section 368 smiles on takeover trans-
actions. 1S7 For example> the merger of the target into the publicly held cor-
poration can be tax free. ISS So can the exchange of the stock of the target for 
voting stock of the publicly held corporation (a B reorganization).159 Thus, 
the owners can convert an illiquid asset (stock of a closely held corporation) 
into a liquid asset, without paying a tax charge. The stock received in the 
publicly held corporation can eventually be sold (likely pieceITleal) in a public 
ITlarket. 160 
Can the taxpayer get to the same place starting with a partnership? 
AssuITling a binding agreement with the publicly held corporation that will 
acquire the stock is in place before incorporation, probably not. Here, unlike 
the public offering scenario above, there are no helpful regulations to bail 
out the taxpayer. Further, Revenue Ruling 1970-140,161 now getting a little 
long in the tooth, under similar facts says the taxpayer fails section 351 (a). In 
Revenue Ruling 1970-140, pursuant to a preexisting agreement, a taxpayer 
incorporated a sole proprietorship and then purported to swap the stock he 
receives on incorporation for the stock of a public corporation in a tax-free B 
reorganization. 162 The Service concluded that the taxpayer's receipt of stock 
on incorporation of the sole proprietorship was "transitory and without sub-
stance for tax purposes. . . ." The Service reasoned that the two steps, the 
incorporation and the B reorganization, should be integrated, so that rather 
than an incorporation and a B reorganization, the taxpayer is sitnply seen as 
contributing property to the public corporation. This means that the 800/0 
control test of section 351 has to be applied with regard to the public cor-
poration. The taxpayer, of course, does not ITleet the 800/0 control test under 
these circumstances, and thus the gain or loss inherent in the contributed 
property is not sheltered by section 351 (a). As restructured, there is a full 
taxable exchange of the taxpayer's property for the stock in the public corpo-
ration. 163 
More recently, the Service in Revenue Ruling 2003-51 both affir01ed and 
distinguished Revenue Ruling 1970-140, and surprisingly concluded that the 
157 See LR.C. § 368; BITTKER & EUSTICE. supra note 10. , 12. Gain is recognized to the 
extent "boot" is received; in this context. boot is money and property other than qualifjring 
stock. 
158I.R.C. § 368(a)(l)(A). Gain is recognized (and sometimes dividend income is earned) to 
the extent of cash received. LR.C. § 356. Basis of shares received is determined under Code 
section 358, a process which accounts for the cash received as well as the recognized gain and 
dividend income. 
159LR.C. § 368(a)(I)(B). 
161JSee 17 C.ER. § 230.145 (2008). 
161 Rev. RuL 1970-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73. Here the taxpayer started with a sole proprietorship 
instead of a corporation, but the principle is the same. 
1621.R.C. § 368 (a)(l)(B); Rev. Rul. 1970-140,1970-1 C.B. 73. I simplify the facts. Actually, 
the taxpayer transferred the assets of the sole proprietorship to an existing corporation wholly 
owned by the taxpayer. Rev. Rul. 1970-140, 1970-1 C.B. 73. 
163There is no tax consequence to the public corporation. I.R.C. § 1032. 
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control test of section 351 (a) was m.et, notwithstanding a pre-incorporation 
binding agreement to dispose of the stock, if the taxpayer could have gotten to 
the same end result tax free using a different series of steps. 164 In the takeover 
transactions I posited above~ that would not be possible. However, Revenue 
Ruling 2003-51 tantalizingly suggests that section 351 (a) could apply to the 
first step in the takeover transactions I described above. 
Treating a transfer of property that is followed by a nontaxable disposition 
of the stock received as a transfer described in I.R.C. § 351 is not necessarily 
inconsistent with the purposes ofI.R.C. § 351.165 
Taken alone, this language fllight suggest that incorporating a partnership 
and having the resulting corporation engage in, for exam.ple, a B reorganization 
passes muster, notwithstanding the existence of a pre-incorporation 
binding agreement for the reorganization. The problem is that the quoted 
language cannot be read in isolation. Revenue Ruling 1970-140 involved 
an incorporation followed by a previously agreed upon B reorganization. 
Revenue Ruling 2003-21 does not revoke Revenue Ruling 1970-140. 
Accordingly, the quoted language is either (1) the result of sloppy drafting, 
or (2) an indication of where the Service wants to go, though it does not have 
the intestinal fortitude to go there yet. 166 
There are no cases contrary to Revenue Ruling 1970-140.167 Therefore, 
owners of a partnership wanting to be the target of a takeover and wanting to 
have a binding agreement for the takeover before incorporation either have to 
live with taxable gain on incorporation (i.e. usually be, from a tax perspective, 
suicidal), or be willing to take their chances that Revenue Ruling 1970-140 
no longer represents the Service's position. If, on the other hand, there is no 
binding agreement for the takeover before incorporation, the incorporation 
should be able to fall within section 351 (a). Depending on how literally the 
Service and the courts apply the binding agreement test, a partnership may be 
able to make substantial progress toward negotiating the takeover, and then 
bring it to closure after incorporation. Having the takeover agreement fully 
prepared and then simply signing it after incorporation might be pushing the 
binding agreefllent test past the breaking point. The partnership and its part-
ners could not be confident with facts that extreme that the courts will stay 
164ReV. Rul. 2003-51,2003-1 C.B. 938. 
165 Id. 
166While I follow the Service's lead in focusing on section 35 L mere is also a substance-over-
form or step transaction argument, or both, that the taxpayer in Revenue Ruling 1970-140 
did not engage in a valid B reorganization. The argument would be that. at essence, what was 
involved was a swap of assets for stock in the public corporation rather than stock for stock as 
required by section 368(a)(l)(B). See BI'rTKER IX EUSTICE, supra note 10, ! 12.04. The solu-
tion I propose would effectively address this issue as well. See infra text accompanying notes 
175-186. 
167Indeed, one case is consistent with Revenue Ruling 1970-140. See W. Coast Mktg. Corp. 
v. Commissioner. 46 T.C. 32 (1966). As discussed supra note 122, west Coast is of dubious 
authority. 
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with the literal language of the binding agreement test as enunciated by the 
Tax Court. Of course, as noted above, life is m.uch simpler if the owners start 
with an S corporation. The incorporation of the S corporation will almost 
always be old and cold before the section 368 reorganization happens. 
d. Section 1244. A minor benefit for C and S corporations is section 1244. 
It permits losses on the sale or exchange of corporate stock (normally a capi-
tal asset) to be treated as ordinary losses rather than capital 10sses. l68 Capital 
losses are deductible from capital gains. In addition, individuals may deduct 
up to $3,000 of any excess of capital losses over capital gains from ordinary 
income. 169 Ordinary losses are generally fully deductible, subject to the at-risk 
rules of section 465 and the passive loss rules of section 469. However, the 
aggregate amount that can be treated as an ordinary loss under section 1244 
is not huge, $50,000 per year for an individual, $100,000 for a husband 
and wife filing jointly.170 Section 1244 also only applies to stock issued by 
a corporation that qualifies as a small business corporation at the time the 
stock was issued. A small business corporation is one with no more than $1 
million of capitalization. I7l Finally, section 1244 tends to be less valuable for 
S corporations than C corporations, as losses flow through to the shareholders 
in an S corporation,l72 meaning that often there will not be much stock tax 
basis left to generate losses on a sale or exchange. As partnerships also pennit 
losses to flow through to partners,173 there is no crying need .. or indeed much 
justification, for some kind of partnership tax analog to section 1244 in a 
non-Subchapter S world. 
3. Smoothing the Corporate Pathways 
Serious problems with partnership incorporations currently exist prifllarily 
when the incorporations are followed by some form of section 368 (a) reor-
ganization. I discuss the justification for permitting incorporations to be fol-
lowed by reorganizations in more detail below, but before I discuss the "why" 
of it, I will discuss the "how" of it. 
lt is at least theoretically possible for the Code to permit partnerships to 
engage in tax-favored reorganization transactions with corporations directly. 
But that would require penning a parallel reorganization system. The cur-
rent corporate system is of long standing and incorporates substantial anti-
abuse provisions. I74 Rather than create a parallel system, it is simpler and 
more elegant to amend section 351 (a) to provide that its control test is met 
even if the incorporation is followed by a section 368 reorganization or other 
tax-favored transaction, whether or not there is a binding agreement to enter 
J68I.R.C. § 1244(a). 
169I.R.C. § 1211(b). 
17°I.R.C. § 1244(b). 
171I.R.C. § 1244(c)(1)(A). (c)(3)(A). 
172See supra text accompanying notes 36-45. 
173See supra text accompanying notes 62-65. 
174See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10, , 12.21. 
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into the subsequent transaction at the time of incorporation. 175 This approach 
tneans that taxpayers will have to go through the inconvenience of forflling an 
often transitory C corporation, but the burden on the taxpayers is small when 
cOlTlpared to the burden to the tax systetn generally if a parallel reorganization 
system is created. 
Additionally, the section 368 reorganization provisions should be amended 
to make clear that they apply even if the participating corporation has recently 
incorporated. This amendment is necessary to deal with an attack from the 
other end of the transaction. While the focus to date has been on section 
351, there also could be an arguInent, for example, that the B reorganization 
stock-for-stock swap rules are not met if the stock comes from a recently 
incorporated partnership. The Service could argue the flip side of Revenue 
Ruling 1970-140,that in substance the acquiring corporation is not swapping 
its stock for stock, but its stock for assets. 
But the statutory change should go further. Incorporations followed by 
public offerings and ESOP-type structures appear to be safe now, but the 
authority for the current treatInent could be stronger. The binding agreement 
test, for exatnple, comes out of the Tax Court. Judges on other courts can 
disagree or the Tax Court can change its mind, or both. A Inore hard-wired 
set of rules to help integrate Subchapters Sand K is preferable. The rules of 
Revenue Ruling 1984-111, the current regulatory rules for public offerings, 
. and the binding agreetnent test should be made statutory, except that, as 
noted above, section 351 (a) applies even if there is a binding agreement to 
engage in a reorganization transaction after incorporation. 
One might ask why not pertnit an unrestricted tax-free incorporation. with 
no limits on what the taxpayer can do with the stock after incorporation. But, 
as I discuss in tnore detail below, section 351 provides tax-favored treatment 
because the taxpayer is, essentially, continuing his investment in a different 
fortn. If all or most of the stock is presold, what is really taking place is a sale of 
the incorporated assets and not a bona fide conversion to the corporate form. 
Pre-incorporation binding agreefllents that provide that after incorporation 
there will be public offerings or corporate reorganizations are inoffensive as 
the assets stay in corporate solution. But if the substance of the agreement is 
a sale of the assets, the substance should control. Of course, SOflle taxpayers 
Inay negotiate the sale of the stock, then incorporate, and then profllpcly sell 
175 1 would include «divisive reorganizations" under section 355 within this rule. See BrITKER 
& EUSTICE. supra note 10. , 11. Revenue Ruling 1970-140 actually applied a contribution of 
property to an existing corporation followed by a B reorganization. This too should qualify 
under an amended section 351 (a). 
H.R. 4137. discussed infra at notes 291 to 308. took a filore lifilited approach. and would 
have amended section 351 to provide that the step transaction and sifililar doctrines do not 
apply for purposes of deterfilining the section 351 control requirefilent in any case in which 
a partnership that is actively engaged in a trade or business transfers substantially all of its 
property to a nonpublicly traded corporation. if that corporation then enters into a reorgani-
zation. 
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the stock. But that problem exists under current law and the current law rules 
of substance over form remain available to address the problem. 
As to the "why" of allowing partnership incorporations to be immedi-
ately followed by reorganization transactions: Courts have noted that section 
351 is intended to apply where "there has been a mere change in the form 
of ownership."176 The taxpayer has not truly "cashed in on the theoretical 
gain .... "177 Similarly, the legislative history to the predecessor of section 351 
notes that the legislation provides new rules for "those exchanges or 4:trades' 
in which, although, a technical 'gain' may be realized under the present law, 
the taxpayer actually realizes no cash profit.'''178 This continuity of investment 
principle also applies in the section 368 reorganization context. 179 Partners 
who incorporate a partnership and then engage in a section 368 reorganiza-
tion have not, it can be defensibly argued, "cashed in on their theoretical 
gainn either. The question, in other words, is if a section 351 (a) transaction 
can be tax favored and a section 368 reorganization can be tax favored,180 why 
not pennit the two to happen in quick succession and be tax favored? 
In other contexts, the Code permits taxpayers to string tax-favored transac-
tions together. There is no limit on the nUOlber of section 351 transactions, 
section 721 transactions, section 368 reorganizations, and like-kind exchanges 
under section 1031 that a taxpayer can do. Partners can form partnerships 
tax free and liquidate partnerships tax free as often as they want. The better, 
or at least Inore precise, question is not how many tax-favored transactions 
can be strung together, but does each Code section allowing a tax-favored 
transaction Olake sense on its own terms. To the extent it does, the fact that 
a taxpayer can engage in several tax-favored transactions in a row need not 
be offensive. For the two sets of Code provisions under discussion, section 
351 and section 368, they indeed usually do make sense independently as the 
taxpayer's investment is being continued, and thus allowing them to be done 
in quick sequence is not inherently objectionable. 
Does the analysis change if one goes FroIn holding a large illiqUid interest 
in one entity to a small, liquid interest in a publicly held corporation? Here 
one has not just changed the form of the investment; one has to a great extent 
changed its fundamental nature. Yet that is currently allowed. One can merge 
one's closely held corporation into a Fortune 500 company on a tax favored 
basis,181 and Inergers are just one of several types of reorganizations in section 
176Stewart v. Commissioner. 714 F.2d 977. 987 (9th Cir. 1983). 
177 Id.; see also Hernpt Bros. v. United States, 490 F.2d 1172. 1177 (3d Cir. 1974). 
178S. REp. No. 275, 11-12 (1921). 
179See BrT'TKER & EUSTICE. supra note 10, ! 12.01 (lJ. There is an assumption that a sec-
tion 355 transaction is. in fact. a type of reorganization; see Revenue Act of 1951. Pub. L. No. 
82-183.65 Stat. 540; BrrTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10, ! 11.01 [1]. [2]. 
18°1 use the term "tax favored" instead of "tax free," as gain can be recognized. See LR.C. 
§ 354. 
181 See LRC. § 368(a)(1)(A). 
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368 that permit this result. 182 If these transactions are to be permitted gener-
ally, and I see no prospect for this changing, they should be permitted for 
partnerships that incorporate shortly before the section 368 reorganization. 
Cooperation from the states is also required. As discussed earlier, in many 
states, incorporating a state law partnership or LLC can pose major challeng-
es. 183 Scate transfer taxes may apply, and consent by landlords and banks to 
the transfer of assets may be required, etc. 184 What are needed are conversion 
statutes. They already exist in many states. 185 Under such a statute, a state law 
partnership or LLC can convert into a state law corporation while being con-
sidered the same entity for scate law purposes. This will avoid asset transfer 
Issues. 
Where the intention is to take the business of the LLC public, an alterna-
tive solution to the state-level problem would be to persuade the market to 
accept publicly traded LLCs. Then no state law conversion would be needed. 
The LLC-partnership could convert for tax purposes to an LLC-corporation. 
Revenue Ruling 1984-111 or its statutory equivalent would need to be 
amended to make clear which of the "Options" would apply on such a con-
version, but generally the transaction should be tax free. 186 Publicly traded 
LLCs already exist. The difficulty with this approach is the market for pub-
licly traded securities is accustomed to dealing with C corporations as an 
overarching entity. As noted in the venture capital discussion above,187 the 
tnarket is also accustomed to dealing with, and often prefers, C corporation 
ownership structures, including its classes of common and preferred stock. 
There will thus likely be resistance to the large-scale use of publicly traded 
LLCs.188 Perhaps LLC statutes could be amended to permit owners to hold 
"C~llltnon and preferred stock," but at that point it m.akes as much sense to 
si.luply have a state conversion statute. 
4. The Capital Gain Freeze 
Another advantage of an S corporation over a partnership is the so-called 
capital gain freeze technique. This normally presupposes a taxpayer who owns 
real estate that is a capital asset189 with substantial, inherent long-term capital 
gains. If the property is sold before development, these gains are taxed at 
18
2 See I.R.C. § 368(a)(l); BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10, ! 12. 
183See supra text accolllpanying note 129. 
184See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., TAX-PROP. § 13-201 et seq. (LexisNexis 2007). 
185 See BISHOP & Ki.EINBERGER, supra note 17. , 12.14. 
186See supra text accolllpanying notes 115-18. 
187 See supra text accolllpanying notes 129-31. 
188See Fleischer, supra note 114. at 137; Goldberg. supra note 114, at 943. 
1891t is also possible for the property to be a section 1231 asset, which includes real property 
used in a trade or business. If a taxpayer's gains frolll section 1231 assetS exceed his losses from 
those assets, all the gains and all the losses are generally characterized as long terlll capital gains 
and losses. I.R.C. § 1231. It is probably lTIore common for the property to be a capital asset 
before it is developed. 
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favorable rates. In the case of raw land, for example, the rate is 15% • 190 If 
instead, the taxpayer subdivides and develops the land, selling the lots indi-
vidually, all of the gain on the sales is ordinary income, including the gain 
inherent in the property before development. Property held for sale in the 
ordinary course of a trade or business does not qualify as a capital asset, even 
it was a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer previously. 191 
There is currently a solution to this unhappy state of affairs. Before develop-
ment, the taxpayer can sell the property to an S corporation the taxpayer con-
trols. The S corporation then develops and sells the lots. The S corporation's 
gain on the sale of the lots is ordinary income, but the predevelopment gain 
is locked in as long term capital gain to the taxpayer by dint of the taxable 
sale to the S corporation. 192 The S corporation takes a fair market value basis 
in the property upon purchase. 193 It is very unlikely that the S corporation 
can be funded with sufficient cash to be able to pay for the property outright. 
Most likely the S corporation pays with promissory notes that are payable 
in the future as the S corporation collects revenues from the sale of the lots. 
Under the installment sale rules of section 453, normally the selling taxpayer 
only has to recognize his long-term capital gain as the notes are paid. 194 A 
heavily indebted corporation with a high debt to equity ratio sometillles has 
to worry about the debt being reclassified as equity. 195 This is not generally a 
problelll in the S corporation context, however, as long as the debt meets the 
"straight debt safe harbor."196 
The taxpayer cannot achieve this result by selling the property to a part-
nership. Section 707(b)(2) treats a partner's gain as ordinary income if the 
partner sells property to a partnership which in the hands of the partnership 
is not a capital asset, and the partner directly or indirectly owns more than 
500/0 of the capital or profits interest in the partnership. 197 The selling partner, 
perhaps with other related parties, normally controls the partnership, and the 
property in the hands of the partnership is not a capital asset as the partner-
19°I.R.C. § l(h)(l)(C). 
191 See l.R.C. § 1221(a)(l); Mauldin v. Commissioner. 195 F.2d 714, 715 (lOth Cir. 1952). 
Section 1237 contains a minor exception. I.R.C. § 1237. 
192LR.C. § 100I(c). 
193LR.C. § 1012. 
1945ee I.RC. § 453(e) (explaining limitations that do not usually pose problems). 
195 See BrrTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10. , 4.02. 
1965ee LRC. § 1361(c)(5). The debt must be sum certain payable on demand or on a speci-
fied date, the interest rate cannot be contingent on profits or the borrower's discretion, the debt 
cannot be convertible into stock, and the creditor must be an individual, an estate or trust that 
is qualified to be an S corporation shareholder, or a professional lender. 
197The constructive ownership rules of section 267 apply for purposes of determining 
whether a partner meets the ownership test. These rules would, for example, attribute partner-
ship interests owned by certain family members to the selling partners. See I.RC. § 707(b) 
(3). 
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ship uses it in the business of developm.ent. 198 Section 707(b)(2) is generally 
said to be designed to prevent tax arbitrage. The sale gives the partnership a 
fair market value basis in the property. The likely cost to the related partner 
seller is long term capital gains likely taxed at low rates. Further, the partner-
ship can now depreciate the property from the new, higher basis. 199 At times, 
the tax benefits of the higher basis to the partnership offsets the tax cost to the 
related selling partner. The risk of tax arbitrage is highly unlikely when the sale 
is of real property. The depreciation rates for improvements to real property 
are quite long, 27Y2 years for residential property and 39 years for commercial 
property.200 Usually, only a mathematically-challenged panner accepts the tax 
burden of the sale gain today in exchange for a series of relatively small annual 
depreciation supplements to the partnership for many years in the future. 
Further, the real property involved in capital gain freezes probably is most 
often raw land, which is not depreciable at all. If the sale is of an apartment 
building which the parties want to convert to condominiums, the gain equal 
to depreciation previously taken is typically taxed at a fairly high rate, 25%, 
making the tax arbitrage more uneconom.ical and more unlikely. 201 
It is not apparent why existing, inherent capital gains should be converted 
to ordinary income when the use of the property changes. It is appropriate for 
future appreciation to be taxed in a manner that is consistent with the nature 
of the new use, but not past appreciation. This raises the question of whether 
an overarching solution should he found that would apply across the board 
and not just in the partnership context.202 That is worth considering, though 
it is beyond the scope of this Article. 
To bring some rationality to subchapter K in this regard and further 
integrate Subchapters S and K, at a minifllum section 707(b)(2) should be 
afllended to provide that it only applies to sales of personal property. Thus, 
the capital gain freeze technique for real property could be implemented with 
a partnership. 
19
8 5ee I.R.C. § 1221 (a)(2). The lots held for sale are also not capital assets. See LR.C. 
§ 1221(a)(1). 
1995ection 707(b)(2) overlaps with section 1239. 
2°Ol.R.C. § 168(c). 
201 See LR.C. § 167; Simon v. Commissioner, 68 F.3d 41,46 (2d Cir. 1995); see also I.R.C. 
§ 1 (h)(I)(D). 
202Why require any long term capital gain that arose while property was held as an invest-
ment to be converted into ordinary income when the property is converted to a different 
purpose? Why require taxpayers to go through the fiction of a sale? Well, in truth. there could 
be practical problems. In the classroom, we can make our numbers up. but in the real world 
it is hard to know with certainty what the value is at the rime property is converted to another 
use. Also. how will the service know if property is truly being held for investment? The current 
rule effectively requiring a sale to an S corporation (and under my proposal to a partnership) 
has the advantage of setting a heralding, reportable event that the Service can audit and upon 
which it can reach an independent judgment. Another possible solution that does not require 
a sale is to require a minimum holding period for the property during the investment phase 
where no significant development takes place. perhaps five years, with an appraisal to be done 
at the time of conversion by an independendy licensed and unrelated appraiser. 
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5. ?he Medicare Tax Dodge 
Here I move from the defensible to the sometimes indefensible. 203 
a. Some Background. Section 1401 imposes a tax on u net earning frofil self 
employment" (NESE).204 The tax has two cOfilponents. One component is 
for "old-age, survivors, and disability insurance," commonly known as the 
Social Security.205 The tax is 12.40/0 ofNESE. The maximum NESE to which 
it applies is $102,000 in 2008.206 The other component is for "hospital insur-
ance," comrnonly known as Medicare, and is 2.90/0 of NESE and applies to 
all of a taxpayees NESE.207 There is no dollar limit. 208 
NESE is defined as «gross income derived by an individual from any trade 
or business carried on by such individual, less the deductions . . . attrib-
utable to such trade or business, plus his distributive share of income or 
loss ... from any trade or business carried on by a partnership of which he is a 
member . . . ."209 NESE does not include certain kinds of passive income. 
including portfolio income, capital gain, and similar income (Excluded 
Income).21o I will discuss this in more detail below, but note that in this defi-
nition all partnership income other than Excluded Income in NESE. 
The Social Security and Medicare taxes apply differently to employers and 
employees. They apply to "wages," that is, compensation to an employee for 
services rendered.211 The employer and the ernployee each pay one half of 
the Social Security and Medicare taxes. The total tax is the same as it is for 
the self-employed. Thus, the tax that the ernployer and employee each pay is 
6.20/0 of wages for Social Security (up to the same $102,000 maximum that 
applies to self employment income) and 1.45% of wages for Medicare (with-
out a maximum).212 
A partner cannot be an employee of a partnership or receive wages from. 
a partnership for services rendered.213 Outside of Excluded Income, a gen-
203«Indefensible" waS once also the name of Warren Buffet's private jet. It is now the "Semi-
Defensible." 
204I.R.C. § 1401. 
205I.R.C. § 1401(a). 
206This amount is adjusted for inflation; see Notice 2007-92, 2007-47 I.R.B. 1036. 
207I.RC. § 1401(b). 
208IndividuaIs are entided to a trade or business deduction equal to one half of the self-
employment tax. I.RC. §§ 62(a)(1), 164(f). 
209I.R.C. § 1402(a). 
21°I.R.C. § 1402(a). Among the exclusions are certain rentals from real estate, most divi-
dends, certain interest, and certain property gains (typically from the sale of capital assets). 
See I.R.C. § 1402(a)(I). Certain retirement payments are also excluded. See I.R.C. § 1402(a) 
(10). 
2BThe statutory phrase is "remuneration from employment." See LR.C. § 3121 (a). 
212See I.RC. §§ 3101, 3111; Notice 2007-92,2007-47 I.R.B. 1036. Notwithstanding this 
division. there is evidence that employees bear the economic burden of the entire tax. They pay 
their own share directly and, in effect, the employer's share through reduced wages. See HARVEY 
ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 286 (7th ed. 2005). 
213Rev. Rul. 1969-184. 1969-1 C.B. 256. 
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eral partner's distributive share of incoIne is always NESE.214 NESE does not 
include the distributive share of any limited partner other than guaranteed 
paYITlents under section 707(c) for services rendered.215 Note that a partner 
can hold both a lim.ited and general partner interest, and section 1402(a) 
applies to each separately. The lim.ited partner exception was added to prevent 
passive investors from. obtaining Social Security coverage. Lim.ited partners 
had originally been subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes to the sam.e 
extent as general partners, but Congress was concerned that limited partner-
ships might be established as investment vehicles in order to obtain Social 
Security coverage and excluded limited partners in the late 1970s.216 Who 
qualifies as a limited partner is not defined in the Code or Regulations, but it 
appears from the legislative history and the plain language of the statute that 
a state law limited partner is .rneant.2t7 Thus, apparently all tax partners who 
are not state law limited partners, including LLC meInbers, fall under the 
general NESE rule.218 
To sum.rnarize, all income from a trade or business (other than Excluded 
Inco.rne) of any partner (other than a limited partner) is NESE, regardless of 
the partner's participation in the business, regardless of the capital invested 
in the business, and regardless of the character of the business. It is thus very 
possible for a partner (other than a lim.ited partner) to have NESE that is 
unrelated to any services performed by the partner. 
One might think that both wages and NESE would measure the sam.e 
thing, income earned from the provision of services. The fact that this is not 
the case has much to do with the history of the Social Security tax. The Social 
Security tax structure was originally centered on the employer-employee rela-
tionship.219 In the early years, coverage extended only to lim.ited groups of 
wage earners.220 The self-employed were not covered. 221 Thus, originally it 
was clear that the Social Security tax (the Medicare tax had not yet been 
created)222 applied only to income from services. The self-em.ployed originally 
resisted coverage, but then in the 1950s acquiesced partly due to the fact that 
meaningful coverage could be had at what at the time was still a low rate of 
2141.R..C. § 1402(a). 
2151.R..C. § 1402(a)(13). 
216 See Patricia E. Diller, Breaking the Glass Slipper-Reflections on the Self-Employment Tax. 
54 TAX LAw. 65, 85 (2000). 
217 See H.R. REp. No. 95-702 at 40, 1978-1 C.B. 469,477 (1977). At that time. only a state 
law limited partnership could been meant as LLCs and similar entities did not yet exist. See 
also David C. Culpepper et al., Self-employment Taxes and Passthrough Entities: Where Are We 
Now. 109 TAX NOTES (TA) 211, 212 (2005). The Service might be authorized to expand that 
definition. See infra text accompanying notes 230-238. 
us See Culpepper. supra note 217. 
219 See Diller. supra note 216, at 70. 
22°Id. 
2211d. at 71. 
222 It was enacted in 1965. See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 
Stat. 286. 
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tax.223 Congress had been concerned about the administrative feasibility of 
including the self-employed within the Social Security system, particularly 
with regard to obtaining accurate reports of their income.224 These concerns 
were eventually laid to rest and the self-employed were included, but nothing 
in the legislative history suggests that Congress wanted the focus of the Social 
Security tax to move from a tax on income from services to a tax on income 
from services and capital. Further, at the thne the self-employed were brought 
into the fold, m.uch of the discussion seems to have centered on applying the 
Social Security tax to professionals such as doctors and lawyers, that is, ser-
vice providers.225 ThUS,. when Congress brought the self-employed within the 
Social Security tax system, it likely thought that NESE primarily focused on 
income from services. Further, by excluding certain passive income and later 
income of limited panners (historically by definition passive participants), 
Congress made some effort to exclude from NESE certain kinds of income 
that are not from services. 
Finally, there would have been little logic to expanding the Social Security 
tax to include incoIne from capital. Why should the type of income sub-
ject to Social Security and Medicare taxes for employees be different than 
that for the self-employed? Employers and employees are not being rewarded 
for using double-tax C corporations, as S corporations, which also can have 
employees, are subject to the SaIne employment tax rules as C corporations. 
S corporations have been on the scene since 1958 and conceptually since 
1946.226 Further, the Social Security benefits one receives are a function of 
what one pays in.227 Why would Congress want the self-employed to have a 
larger base for benefits than employees? Whatever Congress's intent, Social 
Security and Medicare taxes should not apply to incoIne from capital. 
b. TIme waits For No Congress. TiIne has passed section 1402 by. There 
is not a lot of logic to its current structure in the current business universe. 
While self-employment taxes should focus on income from services, in an 
LLC universe NESE can, and often does, include much income that is from 
capital. There is no good reason why passive owners who are limited part-
ners are not subject to self-employment taxes and passive owners who are 
LLC members are subject to self-employment taxes. Further, in an increasing 
number of states lifllited partners have increasing rights to participate in the 
affairs of the limited partnership,228 making their automatic exclusion froIn 
NESE dubious. The logic behind these dichotomies has not been apparent to 
223See Diller. supra note 216. at 71-74. 
224 S. REp. No. 1669 (I950); see abo Yoder v. Harris. 650 F.2d 1170. 1173 (I Om Cir. 1981) 
(discussing the relevant legislative history). 
225 See Diller. supra note 216, at 71-74. 
226pub. L No. 85-866, 72 Stat. 1606 (1958); see RICHARD B. GOODE, THE POSTWAR 
CORPORATION TAX STRUCTURE (Treas. Dep't 1946). 
227 See Diller. supra note 216. at 70. 
228See Unif. Ltd. P'Ship. Act § 303 (2001). 
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the Service either. 229 
In 1997, the Treasury proposed regulations in this area. This was one of 
several efforts I will outline that attempt to limit NESE to income from ser-
vices, or at least reduce the amount of income from capital that is included 
in NESE. The Treasury faced a terminological challenge, in that it had to 
squeeze its regulations into the statutory general-limited partner structure. It 
did this by freeing the term "limited partner" in the tax statute from that term 
in state law statutes. Under the Proposed Regulations, a member of any state 
law entity that is classified as a partnership for federal income tax purposes 
can be treated as a limited partner for section 1402 purposes under some cir-
cumstances.230 The Proposed Regulations also partially address the overarch-
ing issue of when income is from services and when from capital. 
The laudable objective of the Proposed Regulations is to insure that simi-
larly situated individuals owning interests in entities formed under differ-
ent statutes or in different jurisdictions are treated similarly.231 The Proposed 
Regulations treat an individual as a limited partner unless the individual (1) 
has personal liability for the debts of or claims against the partnership by 
reason of being a partner; (2) has authority to contract on behalf of the part-
nership under the statute or law pursuant to which the partnership is orga-
nized; or (3) participates in the partnership's trade or business for more than 
SOO hours during the taxable year. 232 Note that if a state law limited partner 
meets one of the three criteria, he is not a limited partner for section 1402 
purposes. 
If an LLC is "member-managed," all members have the apparent authority 
to contract on behalf of the LLC, irrespective of whether they hold multiple 
classes of interests or not.233 Consequently, no member of a member-man-
aged LLC qualifies as a limited partner under the Proposed Regulations. On 
the other hand, in a manager-managed LLC, the managers have the exclusive 
authority to manage the LLC, and members who are not managers normally 
do not have any apparent authority to contract.234 Consequently, these non-
managing members can qualify as limited partners as long as they do not fail 
the SOO-hour test. By statute they have no general liability for the obligations 
• 
229 Som.e older private letter rulings treat a LLC lTIem.ber's share of incom.e as NESE. See, 
e.g .• p.L.R. 1994-32-018 (May 6, 1994); P.L.R. 1994-52-024 (Sept. 29, 1994); P.L.R. 1995-
25-058 (Mar. 28, 1995). 
230Prop. Reg. § l.1402(a)-2(h), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997). These were preceded by Proposed 
Regulation section 1. 1402(a)-18. 59 Fed. Reg. 67,253 (1994). which focused m.ore on LLCs, 
as such. 
231 See Prop. Reg. § l.1402(a)-2(h), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702, 1702 (1997) (see "Background"). 
2321d. The 500-hour rule is derived from the regulatory definition of m.aterial participation 
under the passive loss rules of section 469. See Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(1). 
233See BISHOP &: KLEINBERGER,. supra note 17,,7.02. 
2341d. 
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of the LLC; thus test {I} of the Proposed Regulations could not apply. 235 
The Proposed Regulations contain a special rule for services partnerships, 
under the assumption that virtually every one involved will be actively per-
forming services. The Proposed Regulations provided that if substantially all 
of the activities of a partnership involve the performance of services in the 
fields of health, law, engineering, architecture, accounting, actuarial science" 
or consulting, any individual who provides such services for the partnership 
cannot be classified as a limited partner, and thus all of his income is NESE 
{other than Excluded Income}.236 
The Proposed Regulations permit individuals to hold more than one class 
of interest in any partnership except a services partnership. A partner may 
bifurcate his interests, with some interests earning NESE, and other "limited 
partnership interests" not earning NESE.237 Thus, the treatment that is avail-
able today in a state law limited partnership, the Proposed Regulations make 
available to all nonservices tax partnerships.238 It is here that the Proposed 
Regulations make an initial attempt to tussle with the issue of when income 
is frorn. services and when from capital. In effect, the Proposed Regulations 
are saying that for nonservices partnerships (irrespective of the state law clas-
sification) it is perrn.issible to create a class of limited partnership interests to 
which non-NESE income can be allocated. This income can be viewed as 
corning frorn. capital and not from services. While the Proposed Regulations 
are hardly comprehensive, they take a step in the right direction. 
The Proposed Regulations "Were generally well received,239 but Congress 
imposed a rnoratoriulll, stating that they could not be finalized before July 
235 A litnited liability partnership (LLP) is a general partnership with a liability shield. Thus. 
its partners are general partners. and, in tnost states, have the authority to contract to the same 
extent as general partners in general partnerships, and thus also would not have qualified as 
litnited partners under the Proposed Regulations irrespective of whether they hold tnultiple 
classes of interests or not. See Culpepper. supra note 217; see generally, BISHOP & I<LEINBERGE~ 
supra note 17. ,. 1.05. 
236 Prop. Reg. § 1. 1402(a)-2(h)(5), 62 Fed. Reg. 1702 (1997). 
237Under the Proposed Regulations, it is possible to qualify as a litnited partner even if the 
partner participates over 500 hours and does not hold multiple classes of interest. For this rule 
to apply, litnited partners (as normally defined under the Proposed Regulations) tnust own a 
substantial, continuing interest in the partnership, and the rights and obligations of the indi-
vidual in question tnust be identical to those for the limited partnership class. The underlying 
presutnption apparently is that the partner would be paid for her services, and the rest of any 
paytnent should be seen as return on capital. Note that the partnership would still have to have 
two classes ofinterest overall. Prop. Reg. § 1.1402-2(h)(4). 
238The Proposed Regulations, however, pertnit the bifurcation of interests only to the extent 
the individual's rights and obligations with respect to a limited partnership class of interest is 
identical to the rights and obligations of other partners in that class who (1) qualify as limited 
partners under the Proposed Regulations without regard to the bifurcation rules, and (2) own 
a substantial interest in the partnership. Prop. Reg. § 1.1402(a)-2(h)(3), -(h)(4). 
239 See John R. Marquis, Business Problems 6- Planning: Current Status of Limited Liability 
Companies and the Self-Employment Income Tax. 77 MICH. B. J. 440, 441 (1998). 
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1, 1998.240 That date has come and gone without the Treasury taking any 
additional action on the Proposed Regulations, though they have not been 
withdrawn. Congress appears to have been concerned about the risk of exist-
ing state law limited partners being reclassified as other than limited partners 
for federal income tax purposes.241 In fact, this risk was quite slight as most 
litnited partners doubtless fail all three tests.242 Further, in those cases where 
reclassification might happen, it is likely justified. Political pressure, not for 
the first time, may have taken precedence over sound tax policy, and to date 
the Treasury has not had the intestinal fortitude to take another run at it. 
The difficulty with the Proposed Regulations is that they do not tackle the 
income-from-capital versus income-from-services issue head-on. Curiously, 
the Proposed Regulations provide backdoor endorsement of manager-man-
aged LLCs, as they are the only unincorporated entity other than a state law 
limited partnership that can effectively create two classes of interests. LLCs 
are usually preferred to limited partnerships, as limited partnerships require 
two entities to achieve a full liability shield;! the limited partnership itself 
and a corporation or LLC as the general partner.243 To muscle the nonservice 
universe into these two entities-few would want to use C corporations-is 
perhaps not the most sensible approach. On the other hand, the Service was 
bound by the limitations of the statute it was interpreting. The only "out" 
from NESE was the income allocated to a limited partner. Others have had 
a freer hand. 
In 1998, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), 
in response to the Proposed Regulations, suggested a statutory change.244 In 
broad outline, the AICPXs proposed amendment provides that partners in 
tax partnerships have NESE to the extent of the reasonable value of the ser-
vices performed on behalf of the partnership. It contains a safe harbor for 
determining the reasonable value of services. If a partner's NESE varies from 
the safe harbor by more than ten percent, the NESE is subject to "reason-
240 See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 935, 111 Stat. 788, 882 (1997). 
241 See Culpepper. supra note 217, at 222. 
242Congress itself partially acknowledged the truth of this in 1997. When discussing the 
passive loss rules, the Statement of Managers for the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 observes that 
limited partners usually do not materially participate in a partnership's activities. H.R. Rep. 
No. 105-220, at 662 (1997) (Con£ Rep.). reprinted in 97 TAX NOTES TODAY 148-32 (Aug. 1, 
1997); see also Culpepper. supra note 217. 
243In states that allow limited liability limited partnerships (LLLPs) it may be possible to 
get by with one entity. but only a minority of states allow for LLLPs, and most advisors will 
insist on a corporation or LLC as a general partner if the LLLP is going to be doing business 
in a non-LLLP jurisdiction. An LLLP is a limited partnership with a liability shield around the 
entire partnership so that even the general partners have limited liability. See generally BISHOP 
8<: KLEINBERGE~ supra note 17. ! 1.02. 
244AICPA Forwards Legislative Proposal on Self-Employment Taxes. 98 TAX NOTES TODAY 
39-34 (Feb. 27, 1998) [hereinafter AlCPA Proposa/j. The Small Business Tax Modification Act 
of 2004. section 3. takes a similar approach co that of the AICPA (doubtless not by coinci-
dence). See infra notes 281-300. 
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 62. No.3 
INTEGRATING SUBCHAPTERS K AND S 793 
ableness testing on the basis of facts and circumstances. ." The safe harbor 
NESE is the partner's distributive share of partnership incoIne or loss plus 
the section 707(c) guaranteed paYInent for services minus a reasonable rate 
of return on the partner's capital account at the beginning of the year. The 
rate of return on the partner's capital account is deeIned to be reasonable if 
the rate used is 1500/0 of the applicable federal rate245 (AFR) at the end of the 
partnership's tax year. 
The proposal has several shortcoInings. It does not except services partner-
ships, the Inost likely area of abuse, notwithstanding the fact that an objective 
review of most service partnerships would conclude that all or almost all of 
their income is NESE. What is worse, given the safe harbor, service part-
nerships have an incentive to inflate capital accounts to avoid NESE. This 
could be done by Inaking cash contributions to the partnership and hold-
ing them. in a m.oney Inarket account. Further, capital accounts are usually 
not precise measures of the value of partners' invested capital.246 While they 
can under SOIne circuInstances be "restatedn to current value, this is relatively 
uncomm.on.247 A partnees capital account may lag far behind or move far 
ahead of the value of the partnees partnership interest. Thus, a reasonable rate 
of return on the partner's capital account Inay yield a meaningless number. 
Finally, while there is much to be said for bright, predicable lines, the 1500/0 
AFR standard is arbitrary. For some industries the 1500/0 rate could be far 
high or far low.248 The AICPA provides for additional fudge room by permit-
ting partners to vary from the safe harbor by ten percent. Of course, what the 
AlCPA is likely trying to do is lim.it partners' NESE as much as practicable. 
In 2005, the Joint Com.mittee of Taxation aCT) also proposed a statu-
tory change.249 This proposal eliITlinates the special rule for limited partners 
and applies to all tax parmerships. All incom.e, including Excluded Income, 
is NESE in the case of a partnership engaged in the perfonnance of services 
in the fields of health, law, engineering, architecture. accounting, actuarial 
science, or consulting (professional services). For other partnerships, how 
a partner is treated is a function of whether or not the partner "ITlaterially 
245The Service sets short-term. mid-tenTI. and long-term applicable federal rates monthly. 
See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2008-43. 2008-31 I.R.B. 258. Curiously, the AlCPA report does not specify 
which of these three applicable federal rates it would use. See AICPA Proposal, supra note 244. 
246Under the Regulations, capital accounts must be increased for the fair market value of 
contributed property (net of associated debt), money contributed, and allocable partnership 
income. The capital accounts must be decreased for the fair market value of distributed prop-
erty. money distributed, and partnership losses. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(b). 
247 See Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(f). 
248 See Letter from George K. Yin, Acting Chief of Staff, Joint Committee on Taxation, to 
Senators Charles E. Grassley and Max Baucus, at 34. (Aug. 3, 2006) [hereinafter JCT 2006], 
available at http://www.senate.gov/-finance/pressIGpressI2005/prgl 0 1906.pdf. 
249 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N. OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX 
EXPENDITURES, 99 (2005), available at ht:rp:llwww.house.gov/jet/s-2-05.pdf. I do not discuss 
their S corporadon proposals. as they are moot under my proposal. 
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participates" in the partnership.250 If the partner materially participates, all 
income other than Excluded Income is NESE. If the partner does not, only 
his reasonable compensation for services rendered is NESE. 
This JeT proposal has a few problems. One of them is the provision that 
Excluded IncoITle is NESE for professional services partnerships. This is a 
curious change and, as I discuss below, one froITl which the JeT ultimately 
backs away. To take one example of Excluded Income to make the point, 
dividends that a professional service partnership receives are not likely to be 
somehow <"tainted." If dividends should not nonnally constitute NESE, and 
since they are not normally compensation for services they should not, there 
is no apparent reason they should be NESE to a services partnership. Since 
Excluded Income is easily identified, and needs to be identifiable for non-
services partnerships regardless, there is no great additional administrative 
burden by continuing the exclusion for services partnerships. 
Aside from the Excluded Income issue, providing that all income of a ser-
vices partnership is NESE makes good sense. In a small minority of cases, a 
services partnership may legitimately have income from capital. There may 
occasionally be a partner who does not significantly participate in the affairs 
of the partnership, though he probably did at some point. But it is likely that 
in an overwhelming majority of services partnerships, an objective analysis 
would reveal that all the incolTle (other than Excluded Income) is NESE. A 
rule which makes that real world reality the taX reality is difficult to attack. 
Trying to except out special cases for income from capital or income of low-
participation partners helps few and creates opportunities for abuse, as well as 
consequent enforcement challenges. Partners would claim income cam.e from 
capital when it did not, or claim that they participated less than was in fact 
the case. The Service would have to spend time dealing with the misguided. 
It all would not be worth the effort. It is not clear, however, why the JeT 
focused just on professional services partnerships. It seems that the issues 
would be the same for any services partnership. 
Treating all of a partner's income from a nonservices partnership as NESE 
if a partner ITlaterially participates is difficult to justify. A partner might mate-
rially participate in a capital intensive partnership where most of the income 
of the partnership COITles fcoIn the capital invested, not the partnees services. 
Furthermore, since services partnerships are already off the table, this rule is 
very likely to catch situations where the incoIne from capital is substantial. 
The JeT proposal does have the advantage of providing a bright line, which 
can provide for administrative ease, but its bright line is too divorced from. 
reality. 
250The material participation standards were created by section 469. the passive loss rules. 
An activity generally is not passive with regard to taxpayer if he materially participates in it. See 
I.R.c. § 469(c)(1). The Regulations contain various ways in which a taxpayer may materially 
participate. for example. by participating more than 500 hours during the taxable year. See 
Temp. Reg. § 1.469-ST(a). 
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In 2006, the JCT proposed a modified version of its 2005 proposal. It 
essentially drops, or at least no longer lobbies for, its nonservices partner-
ship proposal. It keeps its services partnership proposal, except that Excluded 
Income is no longer NESE.251 
The American Bar Association Tax Section has taken several runs at this 
issue. I will focus only on the most recent effort, if for no other reason than I 
participated in the task force that prepared the Section's comrnents.252 
In its comrnents, which are fairly brief: the Tax Section unsurprisingly 
applauds the fact that the JCT dropped its treatrnent of Excluded Income 
of services partnerships as NESE.253 The Tax Section, however, objects to 
the "wholesale expansion" of the income treated as NESE.254 It is not clear 
to what expansion the Tax Section is referring. The real expansion is occur-
ring because an unchanged section 1402 is applying to a broader range of 
businesses and thus a broader range of income, and is not corning from the 
jCT.255 The Tax Section argues that for both service and nonservice partner-
ships, the rn.ost appropriate rule is to treat as NESE only that portion of the 
net income of a partnership that represents reasonable cornpensation for ser-
vices rendered.256 The Tax Section recofilmends that if the JeT approach for 
service partnerships is adopted, an exception for ~'de minimis service partners" 
be created for those who provide low amounts of services.257 Under the Tax 
Section proposal, NESE for de JTliniJTlis service partners consists of guaran-
teed payments as well as the partners' distributive share of incoJTle generally, 
but in the latter case only to the extent it constitutes reasonable COlTIpensa-
tion for services rendered.258 With regard to nonservices partnerships, the Tax 
Section argues C~strongly" that NESE be lirnited to an amount that constitutes 
reasonable cornpensation, as income also will corne from capital.259 Should 
that be considered to be administratively unworkable, the Tax Section recorn-
rnends a cotnplex proposal that includes guaranteed payments as NESE.260 
Additionally, a "'rn.aterial participation partnees' distributive share of incolTIe 
(other than Excluded Incorne) [is] NESE to the extent of reasonable COlTI-
pensation for services .... "261 The Tax Section further recomrn.ends that there 
251 See JCT 2006, supra note 248. 
252 See ABA Tax Section Suggests Legislative Fix for LLC Self-Employment Tax. 1999 TAX NOTES 
TODAY l33-23 Ouly 6, 1999). 
253 See ABA SECTION OF TAXATION COMMENTS ON ADDITIONAL OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX 
COMPLIANCE PREPARED BY THE STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX'N 7 (Aug. 3. 2006) [hereinafter 
ABA COMMENTS]. I do not address the S corporation proposals. as they are mooted by my 
proposal. 
254 See id. 
25.5 See supra text accompanying notes 206-227. 
256See ABA COMMENTS, supra note 253 at 7. 
257 See id. at 8. 
258Id. 
259Id. at 43. 
260 Id. at B-I. 
261Id. at 9. 
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be a rebuttable presumption that guaranteed payments and the distributive 
share are NESE up to a "presumption amount;" the Tax Section suggests that 
the maximum income to which the Social Security tax is applied ($102,000 
in 2008262) be that presumption amount.263 As I discuss below, it has become 
common for advisors to S corporations to recommend that shareholder-em-
ployees only take the Social Security tax maximum as a salary and let the rest 
of the S corporation's income ~'flow through') as nonwage income. (Elsewhere 
in its comments, the Tax Section endorses this approach.) The Tax Section is 
attempting to obtain official sanction for a practice that likely usually under-
states compensation. If the Social Security tax maximum is the presumption 
arn.ount,. it is a safe bet that the vast majority of partners will limit their 
compensation to be the presumption amount, and large amounts of what 
should be compensation income will escape Social Security and Medicare 
taxes. Congress and the Service should not entertain such an invitation to end 
run the Social Security and Medicare tax system, particularly given the finan-
cial difficulties in which Social Security and Medicare find themselves.264 
I propose amending section 1402 to catch it up with the real world. I dis-
cuss my proposal in terms of partnerships, but would apply it to disregarded 
entities-sole proprietors as well. What the JeT and the Proposed Regulations 
do wisely, and will go a long way toward limiting abuse, is to carve out a spe-
cial rule for partnerships primarily engaged in the performance of services. I 
agree with the JCT that all income of a services partnership (except Excluded 
Income) should be classified as NESE. While it is certainly possible that a 
given service partnership has a substantial investment in capital, allowing 
service partnerships to allocate earnings to capital opens the door wide for 
abuse. As I noted above,. for the vast majority of service partnerships, capital 
is mostly likely not a large income producing factor. Additionally, there may 
occasionally be partners in service partnerships who provide little in the way 
of services, but they likely once did if the partnership is allocating income 
to them. Further, the income that is being allocated to them is, most likely, 
from someone's performance of services. By the mere expedient of shifting 
income from active to inactive partners~ Social Security and Medicare taxes 
should not be avoided. Treating all incom.e (other than Excluded Income) 
from service partnerships as NESE will create little unfairness. while avoiding 
many shenanigans~ and reducing the enforcement burdens of the Service. The 
Proposed Regulations and the JeT, however, lill'lit the rule for service part-
nerships to those engaged in the performance of professional services in the 
fields of health, law, engineering, architecture. accounting, actuarial science, 
or consulting. Yet the underlying policy issues apply to any service partner-
262This amount is adjusted for inflation. See Notice 2007-92. 2007-47 I.R.B. 1036. 
263 See ABA COMMENTS. supra note 253 at 9. 
264 See generally Social Security: Achieving Sustainable Solvency: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on 
Finance. 109m Cong. 1-17 (2005) [hereinafter Senate Finance Hearing], available at http:// 
finance.senate.gov/hearings/27402.pdf. 
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ship, so I would apply my proposal to any service partnership, not just those 
engaged in the specified professions. My broader approach creates the need to 
formally define a services partnership. A reasonable definition is any partner-
ship less than 200/0 of the gross income of which is attributable to nonhuman 
capital. 
For nonservice partnerships, I largely agree with the Tax Section. Anyone 
performing services for a nonservices partnership should be required to be 
paid reasonable compensation for those services, and that amount should be 
NESE. I have no c'presumption amount)) which, as I noted above, will COfll-
monly lead to improper tax avoidance. I treat partnership income in excess of 
reasonable compensation as income from capital and not as NESE. 
The reasonable compensation for services standard may seem unduly vague, 
and indeed will create administrative burdens, but in fact it has been one we 
have lived with for generations. It. had been regularly applied in the C corpo-
ration context.265 Commonly there, shareholder-employees have attempted 
to avoid the C corporation double tax by paying themselves a large salary. 
They argued that as salary, the payment is income to the recipient, deductible 
to the corporate payor, and thus (they hoped) subject to one level of tax.266 
Courts have analyzed these purported salary payments under various stan-
dards, and if they concluded the salary was unreasonably high, reduced it, 
with the excess being reclassified as a nondeductible dividend.267 There have 
also been occasions where the courts have looked at whether a salary is too 
low, as I will discuss below. 
Admittedly, allowing courts to resolve compensation issues creates ineffi-
ciencies and uncertainties. In a given set of circumstances, taxpayers will not 
be able to be completely certain if their allocation between compensation and 
a return on capital will be respected, and it might encourage some to play 
the audit lottery in the hopes that their abusive scheme will not be uncov-
ered. But the reality is that a fixed rule like that of the JCT for nonservices 
partnerships often will be far of the mark. What is appropriate compensa-
tion varies greatly based on the alTIount of capital involved, the extent of the 
services provided, the nature of the industry involved, and doubtless a host 
of other factors. The inequity of a fixed rule in the nonservices partnership 
context argues for a more general standard. Further, the fact that all income 
(other than Excluded Income) of service partnerships is automatically NESE 
will ease the adlTIinistrative burden on the Service and the courts, providing 
26SMenard. Inc. v. Commissioner, 2009-1 U.S.T.C. IIJ 50,270, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 1280 (7th 
Cit. 2009); Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cit. 1999). 
266 See Menard. 2009-1 U.S.T.C.! 50.270, 103 A.F.T.R.2d 1280; Exacto, 196 F.3d at 833; 
I.R.C. § 162(a}. 
267 See Exacto, 196 F.3d at 833 (7th Cit. 1999) (analyzing the reasonableness of the salary 
based on whether an adequate return was being paid to the shareholders on their investment); 
Owensby & Kritikos v. Commissioner, 819 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1987) (applying a multiple-
factor test); see also Haffner's Servo Stations v. Commissioner, 326 F.3d 1 (1 st Cir. 2003) (apply-
ing factors but acknowledging the legitimacy of the Exacto Spring decision). 
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something of an offset. 
c. The ScoJllaw Gambit. The current definition ofNESE means that a tax-
payer who wants to avoid Social Security and Medicare taxes will not find the 
partnership soil very fertile. Ah, but an S corporation, that is a very different 
matter. 'While a partner may not be an employee of a partnership,268 there 
is nothing to keep a shareholder from being an employee of a corporation, 
whether it be a C corporation or an S corporation. Employers and employees 
are only assessed Social Security and Medicare taxes on the compensation that 
is paid to the employee.269 That fact gives rise to the following tax avoidance 
technique using S corporations. The S corporation pays a modest salary or 
perhaps no salary at all to its shareholder-employees. The net income of the 
S corporation not used to pay salaries "flows through" under the regular S 
corporation section 1366 rules, arguably as noncompensation, and therefore 
arguably not subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes. 
This gambit has been going on for m.any years. I spoke about it at CLE 
seIninars some 15 years ago, and advised participants not to form S corpora-
tions just for this purpose, as the Service would likely dose this loophole soon. 
No one on the panels ever disagreed. We were less than prescient. The Service 
has failed to sufficiently police this area. Taxpayers have used S corporations 
to avoid both Social Security taxes and Medicare taxes. Since Social Security 
taxes are only applied to limited amounts of compensation ($102,000 in 
2008270), S corporation shareholders have to pay themselves relatively low 
salaries or no salaries to save these taxes. And, in fact, they have done so. The 
Service has challenged the most piggish gambit users, those that have paid 
theInselves little or no salary. The Service has won all of these cases. Courts 
have generally concluded that the earnings of the S corporation constituted 
compensation to the shareholder-eInployees, either under a substance over 
forIn analysis or by concluding that the distributed earnings constituted rea-
sonable compensation for the services rendered.271 
268Rev. Rul. 1969-184. 1969-1 C.B. 256. 
269 See supra text accompanying notes 211-17. 
270 This amount is adjusted for inflation. See Notice 2007-92, 2007-47 I.R.B. 1036. 
271 See Nu-Look Design v. Commissioner, 356 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2004); Specialty Transp. 
and Delivery Servs. v. Commissioner, 2004-1 U.S.T.C. , 50,203.93 A.F.T.R2d 1374 (3d Cit. 
2004); Spicer Accounting v. United States. 918 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1990); Dunn & Clark P.A. v. 
Commissioner. 853 F. Supp. 365 (D. Idaho 1994); Radtke S.C. v. United States. 712 F. Supp. 
143 (E.D. Wis. 1989). affd per curiam. 895 F.2d 1196 (7th Cir. 1990); Veterinary Surgical 
Consultants v. Commissioner, 117 T.e. 141 (2001), affd 2004-1 U.S.T.C. , 50,209. 93 
A.F.T.R2d 2004-1273 (3d Cir. 2004); W Mgmt. v. United States, 45 Fed. Cl. 543 (Fed. Cl. 
2000); Joly v. Commissioner. 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 633, 1998 T.C.M. (RIA) , 98,361. In these 
cases. the courts often focused on distributed earnings. and typically most or all of the earnings 
were distributed. Distribution should not change the analysis. If the S corporation earnings are 
indeed best classified as compensation to the shareholder-employees, whether or not they are 
distributed in a given year should not change the answer. Typically, the shareholder-employees 
have full control over timing. See also Charlotte's Office Boutique v. Commissioner, 121 T.C. 
89 (2003). affd, 425 F.3d 1203 (9th Cit. 2005). 
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Curiously, the Service has never litigated nor expressed an opinion on the 
more temperate taxpayer who has the S corporation pay her a moderate sal-
ary. 272 For example, in 2008 a neurosurgeon with $1 million of net S corpo-
ration income (before salaries) might pay herself the Social Security income 
maximum of $1 02,000 as a salary, and let the rest of the income How through 
as noncompensation. She thus saves the Medicare tax of 2.90/0 x $898,000 == 
$26,042.273 And she is a happy woman. I choose the $102,000 Social Security 
maximum for a reason. Some advisors are routinely telling their clients to pay 
this amount to themselves as salary, and to treat the balance of the S corpora-
tion income as noncompensation.274 One of my own doctors told me he takes 
this approach, and clearly is under the impression that he is not obligated to 
pay himself more than the Social Security maximum as salary. 
In a pure services S corporation, through which, for example, a doctor 
or a lawyer practices her profession, this is obviously abusive. Most likely, if 
litigated, a court will find all or almost all of the S corporation's income to be 
compensation for services as they have in the adITIinedly more Uhoggis~' cases 
that have been litigated to date.275 
In the closely held corporation context, courts generally have required 
corporations to pay reasonable compensation to their shareholder-eInploy-
ees.276 Continuing with the neurosurgeon example, all of the income of the 
S corporation is attributable to her services. Therefore, normally reasonable 
compensation is all of the net income of the S Corporation. Reasonable com-
272 See H.R. 3970. 110th Congo § 1211 (2007) (attacking the totality of the problem within 
the S corporation context). 
273 Easily the most famous person to use this technique was former senator. vice presidential 
nominee. presidential candidate. and bon vivant John Edwards. Over four years (1995-1998), 
on income of about $27 million, he saved Medicare taxes of over $590.000. See Michael Moss 
& Kate Zernike. Campaign &leaus Edwards's Earnings. N.Y. TIMES. Jul. 10,2004, at A-I. The 
journalism on this news story left something to be desired. The technique was port:rayed as a 
legitimate "tax shelter." [d. If challenged. a court: most likely would have held almost all of the 
S corporation income to be compensation. The specifics: Edwards apparently incorporated 
mid-way through 1995. In that year he paid himself a salary of $180,000 on income for the 
year (including pre-incorporation) of $5 million. In 1996, the S corporation earnings were $4 
million and Edwards received a salary of $360,000. In 1997. the S corporation earnings were 
$11 million and Edwards received a salary of $360,000. In 1998, his final year of law practice, 
the S corporation earnings were $5.5 million with the same $360.000 salary. See Torn Daley, 
Edwards's S Corp: Can ~ Get the Numbers Right?, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 178-32 (Sept. 13, 
2004). The total earnings reported in the Daley piece are somewhat less than in the N.¥. Times 
Article ($25.5 million versus $27 million). I have not found a source for this, but I have heard 
that the $360,000 salary was based on what the average personal injury lawyer makes in North 
Carolina, the state where Edwards practiced law. See also. Kip Dellinger, Edwards's S Corp: The 
Revised Numbers are Still Absurd, 2004 TAX NOTES TODAY 183-33 (Sept. 20, 2004). 
2741 have not come across written evidence of this, but it is often implied. See, e.g., Alan L. 
Olson. Ten Tax Planning Ideas for Small Business in 2009. http://www.groco.com/reading-
roomltax_smallbusiness.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2009). 
275 See supra note 271. 
Z76See Exacto Spring Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1999);Jo~. 76 T.C.M. 
(CCH) at 633, 1998 T.C.M. (RIA) ,98,361 at 2148. 
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pensation must be based on the value of the neurosurgeon herself and not, 
say, the value of the average neurosurgeon. Otherwise the top neurosurgeon 
in a state making five times the average could argue that her cOITlpensation 
should be based on what the average neurosurgeon earns, or one fifth of what 
she is actually earning. That would be an easy way to save Medicare and pos-
sibly Social Security taxes. But if that top neurosurgeon went to work for a 
bona fide employer, she would not accept the average wage, she would insist 
on being compensated for her actual worth. That is her reasonable compensa-
tion, or in the typical case, all of the net income of the S corporation. What 
makes this arguITlent even more persuasive is the fate of the below average 
neurosurgeon. Should a neurosurgeon whose S corporation earns less than 
the average be deemed to have compensation equal to the average? Obviously, 
that would make no sense. 
There might occasionally be an argument that there is a sufficient capital 
investment so that a small percentage of the income is allocable to capital. But 
clearly what is usually going on is an effort to make an end-run around the 
Medicare tax and Social Security tax systems. It is axiomatic that substance 
controls forrn.,277 and likely in the vast rnajority of cases278 the substance is 
that all of the net income of the S corporation constitutes the earnings of the 
service provider, the S corporation form only being used for the purpose of 
lowering Medicare or Social Security taxes, or both. 
Senator Wyden, an Oregon Democrat, calls those who make such inap-
propriate use of S corporations "Social Security Scoffiaws."279 The cost to the 
fisc frorn this technique is not insubstantial. The underpaYITlent of Medicare 
and Social Security taxes through the use of S corporations is estimated to 
be about $6 billion per year for each tax, or about $12 billion per year in 
total.280 
What is curious is how long the CCteITlperate strategy" has been going on 
without the Service addressing the issue. Much of the abuse might have been 
stopped by a siITlple revenue ruling from the Service outlining a classic case 
such as the neurosurgeon eXaITlple and concluding that it does not work; all 
of the S corporation income is wages. Many practitioners are reluctant to 
advise clients to violate a revenue ruling. Nor has the Service ever litigated 
a case similar to the neurosurgeon example, where a meaningful but clearly 
inadequate salary was paid. That likely would have brought closure to the 
area. The Service's failure to act has cost the fisc m.any billions. Of course, the 
277Prank Lyon Co. v. United States. 435 u.S. 561. 573 (1978). 
278 I am aware of no hard data on what percentage of the time this use is made of S corpora-
tions. 
279 See Senate Finance Hearing, supra note 264, at 29-30. 
28°In 2005. the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration estimated that for 2006-
2010, unless the law is changed. the Medicare and Social Security tax gap resulting from 
under-compensation of Subchapter S shareholders-employees would be $30.2 billion and 
$30.8 billion respectively. See id. at 51 (prepared statement of Hon. Russell George. Treasury 
Inspector General for Tax Administration). 
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repeal of Subchapter S will stop the abuse once and for all. 
President Oba11'la, when ca11'lpaigning for the presidency, proposed expand-
ing the Social Security tax base by having an additional two percent Social 
Security tax apply to the wages of both e11'lployers and e11'lployees (four per-
cent of NESE for the self-em.ployed) for those with wages or NESE in excess 
of$250,000. There would be no new taxes on the "doughnut" between Social 
Security maxi11'lutn (currently $102,000) and $250,000.281 The loss to the 
fisc of Medicare and Social Security tax revenues will rise exponentially, if 
President Obamas proposal is enacted without addressing the use of S corpo-
rations to avoid these taxes. 
If it is clear that S corporations can no longer be used to avoid Medicare 
and Social Security taxes, the political resistance to the repeal of Subchapter 
S likely will be dramatically lessened. This is particularly true if the legitimate 
benefits of Subchapter S are incorporated into Subchapter K, and taxpayers 
are given a taxpayer-friendly way of exiting Subchapter S. I discuss the latter 
point in 11'lore detail below 
Iv. Popularit::y of the Various Business Entities 
Given the way tax law has developed, one would expect C corporations with 
their double tax burden to have dropped in popularity, and How-through 
entities such as LLCs and S corporations to have increased in popularity. 
The data and expectations are in alignlllent. Below is a chart showing the 
281 See Notice 2007-92, 2007-47 I.R.B. 1036; see also. e.g., Glenn Kessler, Obama Defines 
Social Security "Doughnut" Plan, June 13.2008. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid= 
20601087&sid=ahPYltpKKVXA&refer=home. 
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Figure 2.-Num her of C Corporation Returns Compared to tbe Sum 




Source: Internal Reverrue Service. Statistics ofJncorne, pUblished and unpUblished data. 
282 JCX-48-08. supra note 5, at 9 (citing Internal Revenue Service. STATISTICS OF INCOME, 
published and unpublished data). 
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One would also expect the popularity of LLCs to have grown. As I dis-
cussed aboveot they offer the potential for relative simplicity along with a lia-
bility shield.283 And again, the facts bear this out. This chart shows the relative 
popularity of LLCs over general and limited partnerships.284 
Figure 4.-Domestic: Partnersbip Returns by Type of Partnersbip. 
1989-2005 
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Source: Bill Pratt. ~Partnership Returns. 2000.- SOl Bulletin, 22. Fall 2002, and Tim Wheeler and Nina Shumofsky, "Partnership 
Returns, 2005," SOl Bulletin, 27, Fall 2007, and Tim Wheeler and Nina Shumofsky, "Partnership Retllm$, 2005," SOl Bulletin, 
27, Fall 2007. 
283 See supra text accompanying notes 105-08. 
284JCX-48-08, supra note 5, at 11 (citing Bill Pratt. Part:nership Returns, 2000. SOl 
BULLETIN, Fall 2002. at 47; TIm Wheeler & Nina Shumofsky. Part:nership Returns, 2005. SOl 
BULLETIN, Fall 2007. at 77-78). 
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The following chart shows the number of partnership tax returns by type. 285 
LLCs now dominate. 
Type of Partnership 
Year Domestic Domestic Domestic Domestic Foreign 
General Limited Limited Limited Partnerships 
Partnerships Partnerships Liability Liability (thousands) 
(thousands) (thousands) Companies Partnerships 
(thousands) (thousands) 
1990 1,267 285 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1991 1,245 271 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1992 1,214 271 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
1993 1.176 275 17 n.a. fl.a. 
1994 1,163 283 48 n.a. n.a. 
1995 1,167 295 119 n.a. n.a. 
1996 1,116 311 221 n.a. n.a. 
1997 1,069 329 349 n.a. n.a. 
1998 945 343 470 26 n.a. 
1999 898 354 589 42 n.a. 
2000 872 349 719 53 3 
2001 815 369 809 69 5 
2002 780 377 946 78 3 
2003 757 379 1.092 88 3 
2004 725 403 1,270 89 4 
2005 729 414 1.465 100 5 
n.a.-not available 
The final chart shows the nUlllber of business entitles filing tax returns 
in 1993, 1998, and 2003, classified by asset size and type of entity.286 Small 
entities are those with less than $100,000 in assets, llledium sized entities are 
those with between $100,000 and $1 million in assets, and large entities are 
those with fllore than $1 million in assets. Note that C corporation use has 
dropped in all three classes. This is somewhat surprising in the large class, and 
may be attributable to the fact that the definition of large is not all that large, 
$1 ITlillion. If the large entity class started at $10 Dlillion, the results might be 
different. S corporation and tax partnership use has increased, but S corpora-
tions dODlinated in 1998 and 2003 alllong small entities and lead in 2003 
285JCX-48-08. supra note 5. at 12 (citing Bill Pratt, Partnership Returns, 2000. Sal 
BULLETIN. Fall 2002, at 45; Tim Wheeler and Nina Shumofsky, Partnership Returns, 2003. 
Sal BULLETIN. Fall 2005. at 50; Tim Wheeler and Nina Shurn.ofsky. Partnership Returns, 
2005. SOl BULLETIN, Fall 2007, at 69). 
286JCX-48-08, supra note 5. at 10. 
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• C co.pC ... ,liODO 
C S Corponlions 
C PIa1nenbip" 
It is conunonly said that LLCs are the <~entity of choice," yet, as of 2003, S 
corporations continue to lead the pack among small and medium sized busi-
ness entities, though the prior charts show LLCs to also be very popular in 
2003. To what is the S corporation popularity attributable? Taxpayers do not 
explain why they choose a particular entity when they file their tax returns, 
but the common belief is that S corporations continue to be popular because 
of the perceived opportunity they provide to reduce Social Security and 
Medicare taxes. For service businesses" tax partnerships such as LLCs offer 
fewer advantages. As they are typically businesses without a large am.ount of 
capital, property contributions and distributions likely do not play a large 
role, and section 754 elections-which can adjust partnership asset bases-
tend to be less valuable. These are two areas where partnerships have signifi-
cant advantages. 288 
287 C corporations were popular among small and medium sized entities in 1998. This likely 
is attributable to the availability of the medical expense deductions. In a C corporation, tnedi-
cal insurance expenses paid to employees, including shareholder-employees. are deductible 
from income under section 162{a) and are not income to the employees due to section 106. 
This benefit was omy available to S corporation shareholders who owned two percent or less of 
the stock of the S corporation. I.R.C. § 1372(a)(2). A comparable benefit is now available to 
the self-employed. including partners and greater-than-two percent shareholders of S corpora-
tions. in section 162(1). It permits thetn to deduct the cost of medical insurance. See Pub. L. 
No. 105-206. 112 Stat. 685 (l998); Pub. L. No. 105-277. 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). 
288See supra text accompanying notes 66-74. 84-92. 
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On the other hand, the ability to vary allocations, which can readily be 
done in a partnership, can be important to a service business. S corporations 
cannot vary allocations as such, but must allocate income and losses based on 
shareholdings.289 It is possible to give a shareholder-employee an option to buy 
Inore shares, but it is highly awkward to continually adjust share ownership. 
An S corporation can make bonus salary payments, but that does not avoid 
the Medicare or Social Security taxes, which applies to all salaries paid, and 
thus a principal motivation for using S corporations is removed.290 However, 
the vast majority ofS corporations have rwo or fewer shareholders {over 880/0 
in 2004).291 For S corporations with few shareholders, the need to vary allo-
cations is much less than it is, for example, for large and medium-sized law 
firms, which, not by coincidence, are usually not S corporations.292 Large law 
firms likely cannot meet the 100 shareholder requirement. MediulTI-sized law 
firms that would use the S corporation format likely can only vary incomes, as 
a practical matter, through bonus salary payments. Again, as salary payments 
do not avoid Social Security and Medicare taxes, there is little lTIotivation to 
use the S corporation. That being the case, most medium-sized law firms (as 
well as most large law firms) are LLCs or LLPs. 
Another disadvantage of S corporations when contrasted with partnerships 
is the inability to include corporate borrowings in the bases of the share-
holder's stock.293 But the need for greater bases is most acute when busi-
nesses operate at a loss, not typical of the average service business. Further, 
the well-inforlTIed can arrange for loans to be made directly to shareholders 
who then can contribute or loan the funds to the S corporation. According to 
2005 data, 99% of S corporations have fewer than $1 million in receipts.294 
Shareholder guaran tees of debt are likely to be required regardless for finns of 
this size, so there is no great sacrifice in having the shareholders borrow the 
funds directly. Further, if the S corporation has only one or rwo shareholders, 
som.e of the problems with such direct borrowings, discussed earlier, are less 
likely to arise.295 For example, it is easier for one or two shareholders to buy 
encumbered property and lease it to the corporation than for 20 shareholders 
to do so. 
In a partnership, the partnership can usually give a service provider a profits 
interest tax free. 296 But for a closely held service business, this ability is rarely 
of great import. It is a very valuable feature in a capital intensive enterprise, 
where one person provides the funds and another the "brains," but in the 
289I.RC. §§ 1366(a). 1377(a). 
29°I.R.C. §§ 3101(a), 311 I (a). 
291 See SOl TAX STATS. supra note 110. 
292 Robert W Hillman. Organizational Choices of Professional Service Firms: An Empirical 
Study. 58 Bus. LAw. 1387. 1401 (2003). 
293 See supra t:ext accompanying notes 79-83. 
294 JCX-48-08. supra note 5. at 15. 
295 See supra text accompanying notes 79-83. 
296 See supra text accompanying notes 93-104. 
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typical closely held~ capital-light service partnership, this distinction does not 
exist. There is relatively little capital involved, and usually everyone is provid-
ing services in some form. 
As this discussion demonstrates, the main advantages of partnerships are 
of little value to small, closely held service businesses. When that fact is con-
trasted with the possible ability to save substantial Medicare taxes and pos-
sibly even Social Security taxes with an S corporation, it is no contest, the S 
corporation wins. Thus, a strong circumstantial case can be made that "Social 
Security and Medicare tax dodgingn is a primary, perhaps -che primary, force 
behind the use of S corporations. 
While the repeal of Subchapter S will end the abusive avoidance of Social 
Security and Medicare taxes, it is important not to stop there. It is vital that 
the rules for assessing Social Security and Medicare taxes be brought into 
alignment with today's LLC-rich universe. 
V. H.R. 4137 
It is a happy day for a law professor when a suggestion in a law review article 
shows up in legislation. I had that good fortune with H.R. 4137, introduced 
in 2004 by Congressman Am.ory Houghton, Jr. Alas, that was the extent of 
my good fortune. H.R. 4137, as it happened, went absolutely nowhere; a 
pity, really, because it was a forward-looking, if imperfect bill. 
H.R. 4137 prohibited further S elections. After a ten-year grace period, 
it provided that existing S corporations were deemed to elect to be taxed as 
partnerships under Subchapter K, though the bill also allowed theIll to elect 
to make the switch before that.297 Moreover, it permitted Illost nonpublicly 
traded C corporations to elect to be taxed under Subchapter K as well. 298 
Under the bill, when an S corporation elected Subchapter K, it -was treated 
as if it liquidated and formed a partnership. Thus, as noted above, the S 
corporation recognized the gain and could recognize the loss inherent in its 
assets;299 that gain or loss, like any S corporation gain or loss, flowed through 
to the shareholders under section 1366. To make the gain and loss recogni-
tion more palatable, the bill provided that the gain and loss recognized by the 
S corporation was amortized over five years, which lessened the pain if there 
was a gain and caused pain if there was a loss. There was nothing in the bill, 
however, to stop an S corporation from actually liquidating and fonning, for 
297H.R. 4137 does not take disregarded entities into account. H.R 4137, supra note 4. 
298Corporations ineligible to elect under Subchapter S are not allowed to elect subchapter K. 
See I.RC. § 1361(b)(2). Included in this group are financial institutions which use the reserve 
method of accounting for bad debts described in section 585 (e.g. ITlany banks). insurance 
companies subject to tax under Subchapter L, corporations to which an election under section 
936 applies (relating to Puerto Rico and possession tax credit), and domestic international 
sales corporations. 
299Code section 336 provides that gain is recognized on the liquidating distribution of 
appreciated property but limits loss recognition if the liquidating distribution is to a related 
person. See I.R.C. § 336(a). (d). 
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example, an LLC. That approach permits a loss (or a gain) to be recognized 
fully and inunediately.300 
Under the bill, any distribution from the erstwhile S or C corporation-
now-partnership to its shareholders-now-partners was a taxable dividend 
to the extent it would have been a dividend under the rules of Subchapter 
5.301 As discussed above, dividends are paid from a corporation's earnings and 
profits.302 As also discussed above;> an S corporation cannot generate earnings 
and profits, but it can inherit them from a C corporation; a distribution from 
an S corporation is a taxable dividend to the shareholders if, to simplify, the 
5 corporation has already distributed its own net income, but has earnings 
and profits.303 Under the bill" an S corporation's or C corporation's earnings 
and profits were passed on to the partnership. H.R. 4137 provided a rule 
for the 5 corporation-now-partnership or C corporation-now-partnership 
that was similar to the rule that currently exisrs for S corporations. If, again 
to simplify, the partnership had fully distributed its own post-conversion net 
income,304 any additional distributions were taxable dividends to the partners 
to the extent of the partnership's earnings and profits. This, of course, was an 
effort by the bill to retain the double taxation that would have applied to the 
C corporation if it had never elected to be taxed as a partnership (or never 
elected Subchapter S on its way to being a partnership). Note, though, that 
the partnership would have had control over the tirning by choosing or not 
choosing to make the distribution. Keeping track of the earnings and profits 
over tirne poses a significant burden. Under the H.R. 4137, earnings and 
profits never expired. 
Under H.R. 4137, it often would have made more sense for an S corpora-
tion with earnings and profits to actually liquidate and fonn another entity 
than to sirnply elect (or be deemed to elect) Subchapter K. As discussed above, 
the S corporation that did not actually liquidate was still deemed to liquidate 
and was still required to recognize the gains and losses inherent its assets. The 
rnain tax advantage under the bill to electing K as opposed to actually liqui-
dating was that the recognized gains were taken in to account over five years. 
But in the case of an actual liquidation. the earnings and profits account is 
wiped clean.305 No earnings and profits means no dividends. Had H.R. 4137 
been enacted, S corporations with earnings and profits and net gains in their 
assets would have needed to balance the deferral of tax gain against the abil-
ity to avoid dividends. Of course, if the 5 corporation had both net losses in 
its assets and earnings and profits (less cornmon, but entirely possible), there 
300Su bject to section 336(d). 
301 See supra text accompanying notes 47-50. 
302 See supra text accompanying notes 21-22. 
303 See supra text accompanying notes 47-50. 
304 Any S corporation net inCOflle retained upon the conversion is added to this amount. 
305The authority for this is implicit in the operation of sections 334(a} and 336 and the 
fact that no provision of the code provides otherwise. See BrrTKER &: EUSTICE. supra note 10. 
, lO.05[2][b]. 
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would have been nothing to balance. Liquidation would have been the order 
of the day. 
H.R. 4137 also expanded the scope of section 1374. Under the bilL upon 
the election to be taxed as a partnership, a C corporation, unlike an S corpo-
ration, did not recognize any gains or losses inherent in its assets.306 Instead, 
section 1374 was applied to the C corporation-now-partnership.307 Recall, 
that as enacted section 1374 applies to an S corporation if it was once a C 
corporation or acquired the assets of a C corporation in a tax-favored trans-
action.308 "When the S corporation recognizes a gain inherent in an erstwhile 
C corporation asset, whether by sale or distribution to a shareholder, a cor-
porate level tax applies, and it applies at the highest corporate tax rate.309 The 
objective of section 1374 is to ensure that the net gain inherent in the assets 
originally held by the C corporation is subject to a corporate level tax, not-
withstanding the fact that the assets are held by an S corporation. 
How H.R. 4137 applied section 1374 to the C corporation-now-partner-
ship is not entirely clear. The idea, clearly, was that there be two levels of tax 
on the net gains inherent in the erstwhile C corporation assets, one at the 
entity (i.e. partnership) level at the highest corporate tax rate, and one at the 
partner level. Further, the thne period during which section 1374 applied was 
expanded froIll the ten years that norfilally applies to 25 years.310 The section 
1374 provision of the bill was, in the filain, unworkable. Section 1374 works 
in the S corporation context because gains and losses normally are recognized 
if an asset leaves corporate solution.311 But that is not necessarily true for 
partnerships. Under section 731 (b}, a partnership nonnally recognizes no 
gain or loss when it distributes property to partners. The distributee partners 
generally take a carryover basis in the distributed property.312 The equivalent 
of an aniIllal tagging rule could have been added to H.R. 4137, providing 
that whoever disposes of a covered asset within the 25 year tiIlle period in 
a taxable transaction Illust pay the corporate tax, but that would have been 
exceptionally difficult to enforce, especially over 25 years. Alternatively, the 
Subchapter K rules could have been changed to require gain recognition any 
time a covered asset is distributed, but again that would have been difficult to 
enforce, especially over 25 years, plus does injury to one of the more funda-
filental rules of partnership taxation. Also, it is not apparent why the ten year 
3{)(iH.R. 4137. supra note 4. 
3{)7Id. 
308See supra text accompanying notes 51-55. 
309 See I.R.C. § 1374. 
310H.R. 4137 is not dear in this regard, but apparently an electing S corporation does not 
recognize the gains or losses in assets subject to section 1374 before the conversion to a part-
nership. Section 1374 continues to apply as it would to an electing C corporation. See supra 
text accompanying notes 51-52. Further, if section 1374 already applies. the ten-year rule (and 
not the 25 year rule) applies. provided the ten years expires before the election is made to be 
a partnership. 
311 This is normally a taxable event. See I.RC. §§ 311> 336. 
312See I.R.C. § 732(a). 
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time fraIne of current section 1374 was increased to 25 years. The extension 
creates a huge~ additional cOlTlpliance burden, and ten years is a time limit the 
world has been living with comfortably since section 1374 was enacted. 
Clearly, Congressman Houghton was attempting to permit the laudable, 
allowing C corporations to elect Subchapter K, while avoiding the objection-
able, permitting large amounts of C corporation gain to avoid a corporate 
level tax. He doubtless also wanted to avoid excessive revenue losses to the 
fisc. I will return to this issue when addressing my own proposal, but apply-
ing section 1374 in the manner H.R. 4137 did was at best an awkward solu-
tion. 
Finally, H.R. 4137 fllade useful, if insufficient, steps in related areas. It 
specifically allowed a section 351 incorporation followed by a section 368 
reorganization, provided that substantially all of the assets of an active trade 
or business were involved.313 It also contained a provision on section 1402 
that was close to the AICPKs proposal.314 The intent behind both provisions 
was good, but for the reasons I discussed in detail above, I recolTlmend a dif-
ferent approach.315 
VI. Repeal Subchapter K Inst:eadJ 
Much ink has been spilled on the problems with Subchapter K.316 It is surely 
true that abuses can happen. While it does not usually make the life of a 
Mom and Pop LLC all that challenging, Subchapter K and its regulations are 
an extraordinarily cOfllplex area of tax law. Of just one piece of this puzzle, 
the special allocation rules of section 704(b), Professor Lawrence Lokken 
fafllously wrote: "[They are] a creation of prodigious complexity ... essen-
tially impenetrable to all but those with the time, talent, and determination to 
become thoroughly prepared experts on the subject."317 Professors George Yin 
and David Shakow, as Reporters for the American Law Institute, produced 
an ifllpressive study that was critical of Subchapter K. In it they proposed 
"an optilTlal tax system" for the "simple private business firm" grounded in 
313H.R. 4137. supra note 4. 
314See supra text accompanying notes 244-48. 
315 See supra text accompanying notes 264-67. 
316 See, e.g., William D. Andrews, Inside Basis Adjustments and Hot Asset Exchanges in 
Parmership Distributions. 47 TAX L. REv. 3 (1991); Cunis J. Berger, W(h)ither Partnership 
Taxation, 47 TAX L. REv. 105 (1991); Noel B. Cunningham. Commentary Needed Reform: 
Tending the Sick Rose. 47 TAX L. REv. 77 (I991); Mark P. Gergen. Reforming Subchapter K' 
Special AJiocations. 46 TAX L. REv. 1 (1990); Lawrence Lokken, Taxation of Private Business 
Firms: Imagining a Future Without Subchapter K. 4 FLA. TAX REv. 109 (1998); William S. 
McKee, Parmership Allocations: the Need for an Entity Approach. 66 VA. L. REv. 1039 (1980); 
Philip F. Postelwaite et aI .• A Critique of the ALI'S Federal Income Tax Project-Subchapter K: 
Proposals on the Taxation of Partners. 75 GEO. L.J. 423 (1986); Rebecca S. Rudnick. Enforcing 
the Fundamental Premises of Partn~hip Taxation. 22 HOFSTRA L. REv. 229 (1993); see also 
Karen Burke. Parmership Distributions: Options for Reform, 3 FL. TAX REv. 677 (1998); Darryll 
Jones. Toward Equity and Efficiency in Partnership Allocations, 25 VA. TAX REv. 1047 (2006). 
317Lawrence Lokken. ParmershipAllocations. 41 TAX L. REv. 545,621 (1986). 
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Subchapter K~ but "with a strong resemblance to Subchapter S."318 Professors 
Yin and Shakow did not launch a full frontal assault on Subchapter K, per-
haps cognizant of the political perils of such an effort. In addition to the 
private business firm proposal~ they did recommend a number of substantial 
changes to Subchapter K, however. 319 
I actually think that Subchapter K has much to com.mend it. The flexibility . 
it offers prornotes economic efficiency. Yes, abuses can happen, but I have 
yet to see any data suggesting that they are a large part of the partnership 
pie. Further. S corporations. with their rigid qualification rules, particularly 
the one class of stock requirefllent, are simply unsuitable for many complex 
business undertakings where income is often allocated in tranches to different 
owners. But happily, I do not need to engage that debate here. The reality is 
that repealing or dramatically changing Subchapter K is a political nonstarter. 
Perhaps the best evidence of that fact is that Professors Yin and Shakow were 
not able to persuade the American Law Institute, a reforrn-oriented and-in 
the view of some, moderately progressive-organization, to adopt their views, 
notwi thstanding that they did not even go so far as to recommend repeal of 
Subchapter K. Repeal of Subchapter K has never been give serious consid-
eration by Congress. In contrast, there has actually been a bill in the House 
recorn.rn.ending repeal of Subchapter S.320 Further, some kind of partnership 
taxation will always have to be with us if for no other reason than taxpayers 
can inadvertently find thelllselves in a state law partnership.321 They cannot 
inadvertently end up in an S corporation. So, if we cannot repeal Subchapter 
K, surely we should repeal Subchapter S. As the above discussion indicates, 
the legitirnate benefits of Subchapter S are relatively few in number and can 
either be incorporated into Subchapter K or be achieved by some adjustments 
to Subchapter C. Having two pass-through regimes is inefficient. Similarly 
situated taxpayers are taxed differently, to the advantage of those with skilled 
advisors, often to the disadvantage of those with unskilled advisors. This 
violates principles of vertical equity. Well-advised taxpayers can effectively 
choose, albeit within limits, how much tax to pay. Taxpayers will exploit the 
differences between their regimes for their benefit. A classic example is using 
S corporations to beat the Medicare tax. These considerations make it more 
difficult for the government to assess a reliable, appropriate tax.322 Further, the 
318See ALI Report. supra note 91, at 125. This would have been an elective system. For 
example, it would have in some cases severely restricted special allocations and would have 
required gain recognition (as well as loss recognition in the case of a liquidation) on the dis-
tribution of assets. See also id. at 129-30 (Table 1); id. at 183 (Proposal 4-2(l)(a»; Uf. at 
215 (Proposal 4-5(1)(a»; id. at 300 (Proposal 5-1 (l)(a»; Jeffery A. Maine, Linking Lim#ed 
Liability and Entity Taxation: A Critique of the ALI Reporters' Study on the Taxation of Private 
Business Enterprises, 62 U. PITI'. L. REv. 223 (2000). 
319 See generally ALI Report, supra note 91. at 273-425. 
320H.R. 4137. supra note 4; see supra text accompanying notes 297-315. 
321 See A.r.A.N R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RlBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIPS 
! 2.0I(c) (1988). 
322 See ALI Report. supra note 91. at 45-47. 
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Service is required to train personnel in two different pass-through regimes. 
That said, Subchapter K is a far from perfect taxing regimen. The ALI 
Report and others have pointed out its deficiencies and made intelligent rec-
ommendations for improverrtent. Reform of Subchapter K should continue. 
But the fact that Subchapter K is in need of reform is not a reason to continue 
a parallel pass-through regime in Subchapter S. One of the two systems needs 
to go. It won't be Subchapter K; therefore it should be Subchapter S. Indeed:J 
the existence of Subchapter S impedes the reform of Subchapter K. Having 
two system.s in play can prevent policy makers and the Service from becom-
ing fully focused on one. It spreads limited human resources thin. Likely, the 
pace of reform of Subchapter K will pick up~ once Subchapter S is off the 
playing field. 
VII. Let NonpubUc Corporations ColDe to the Party 
In my prior artide~ I discussed the possibility of also permitting nonpublicly 
traded C corporations to elect Subchapter K. At that time, I demurred. I 
felt repealing Subchapter S was a daring enough move. While I was (and 
am) aware of no data on the cost to the fisc of allowing only nonpublic C 
corporations to elect Subchapter K, there was data on the cost of integration 
for public and nonpublic corporations in the aggregate, and that number was 
intimidating: $36.8 billion in 1991 dollars.323 As I discuss below, the cost of 
permitting nonpublic C corporations to elect Subchapter K may now not ~e 
large.324 Further, we live in a different tax and nontax universe than when I 
wrote flly prior article. Somewhat emboldened by H.R. 4137, I believe the 
tim.e is ripe to permit domestic, nonpublic C corporations to elect Subchapter 
K as well (or become disregarded entities if they have a single shareholder).325 
Like H.R. 4137, I would exclude corporations that are currently ineligible for 
Subchapter S from fllaking this election.326 
C corporations can have highly cOfllplex stock and debt structures. In 
many cases, those structures may make the switch to Subchapter K impracti-
caL But usually, Subchapter K 'Will be up to the challenge. Many partnerships 
323Various integration proposals were considered. The one referenced in the text involves 
an allocation to shareholders of a 31 % credit for corporate taxes paid. Tax-exempt and for-
eign shareholders would receive no credit. The credit would accompany an allocation of 
income to the shareholder. DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVlDUAL AND 
CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS 152 (1992). 
324See infra text accompanying notes 358-363. 
325 As did H.R. 4137. I define a nonpublic C corporation as a domestic corporation no stock 
of which is readily tradable on an established securities market or otherwise. 
326Generally. a pass-through regime is highly awkward for these types of entities. Section 
1361 (b)(2) lists corporations that are ineligible to elect to be taxed under Subchapter S. Included 
are financial institutions which use the reserve method of accounting for bad debts described 
in section 585 (e.g. many banks). insurance companies subject to tax under Subchapter L, 
corporations to which an election under section 936 applies (relating to Puerto Rico and pos-
session tax credit). and domestic international sales corporations. See LRC. § 1361 (b)(2); see 
also EUSTICE &. KUNTZ. supra note 59, ! 3.05. 
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have highly complex ownership and debt structures, but thrive in Subchapter 
K.327 
The Federal government is regularly changing the ground under the busi-
ness owners' feet. An owner who 15 years ago rationally chose a C corporation, 
might not have done so if she had known of the impending LLC revolution. 
The tax benefits that she may have gleaned by using a C corporation are, given 
the overall double tax burden, unlikely to have been so great as to justify lock-
ing her into a now outdated choice. Further, why should different nonpublic 
business entities be taxed differently? Closely held businesses should at least 
have the option of playing on the same field, making for greater horizontal 
equity. Other countries have taken a uniform approach.328 I recommend that 
the United. States also take a more uniform approach, though I would not 
make the election of Subchapter K mandatory for C corporations. As I dis-
cussed above, it would be very difficult for nonpublic entities to get by wholly 
without Subchapter C.329 As I discuss below, I recommend that C corpora-
tions be allowed to switch to Subchapter K on a taxpayer-friendly basis.330 
VIII. The Nuts and Bolts 
A. S Corporations 
A first step toward repeal is to prohibit any further S elections, as of the effec-
tive date of any relevant act. Here I follow the lead ofH.R. 4137.331 No new 
corporations and no existing C corporations may make S elections. There is 
no need to create more of a dying entity. There is little unfairness at work here 
for potential future users, as the LLC usually constitutes a perfectly viable, 
indeed usually preferable, alternative, especially if the integration proposals I 
outlined above are adopted. 
How should taxpayers who are already operating as S corporations be 
treated? They cannot be expected to adapt to new rules overnight. But there 
is also little logic in allowing the indefinite continuation of a dying entity. 
The sensible answer is to give existing S corporations a meaningful amount of 
time to exit gracefully. How much tiDle is enough time? There is no certain 
327 See, e.g., Karen T. Lohnes, John Schmalz & Craig Gerson, Value Equals Basis and Partners' 
Distributive Share: Stuffing, Fili-ups, and Waurfolls, 105}. TAX'N 109 (2006). 
328 Germany. for example; see Michael J. Munkert. Fallstricke der neuen Thesaurierungs-
begitnstigung. STEUERCONSULTANT 34 (2007). 
329 See supra text accompanying notes 113-67. 
3300ne might think that permitting C corporations to continue to elect Subchapter S dur-
ing the ten-year death watch might be a way of facilitating the transition to Subchapter K. but 
in fact that often. perhaps usually, will not be the case. The S corporation one-class-of-stock 
rule of section 1361 (b) (1)(0) will make Subchapter S unavailable to many existing C corpora-
tions. Also. section 1374 will take away much of any tax benefit that Subchapter S provides. 
See infra text accompanying notes 358-64. 
331 See S Corp. Burial, supra note 3, at 643. 
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answer, but the ten-year time period ofH.R. 4137 seems reasonable. 332 
During the ten-year death watch, an S corporation may: 
1. Elect disregarded entity status, if it has a single owner (and be deemed 
to liquidate and distribute its assets to the single owner), 
2. elect Subchapter K, it is has two or more owners (and be deemed to 
liquidate and form a partnership)~ 
3. eleCt Subchapter C (no liquidation), 
4. formally liquidate by the end of the ten-year term, or 
5. take no action, in which case at the end of the ten-year term it is 
deerned to liquidate and form a partnership or, if it has a single owner, 
it is deerned to liquidate and become a disregarded entity. 
If the S corporation does not actually liquidate (and does not elect Suchapter 
C), it needs to be deerned to be liquidated for tax purposes (1) to establish 
capital accounts for the partners correctly,333 (2) for section 704(c), sections 
707(a)(2)(B), and 737~34 to apply properly in the case of partnerships, and 
(3) to establish the owner's bases in the assets properly if the S corporation 
becornes a disregarded entity. The regular S corporation rules apply until the 
liquidation, deerned or actual, takes place, with one rnodification. I apply 
my recommended reform of Social Security and Medicare taxes to S corpo-
rations during the transition period. Thus, all income of an S corporation 
prirnarily engaged in the performance of services is subject to Social Security 
and Medicare taxes. For capital intensive S corporations, on the other hand, 
reasonable compensation for services rendered rnust be paid, but only that 
cornpensation is subject to Social Security and Medicare taxes. 335 
What tax rules should apply to a deemed or actual liquidation? Under the 
current rules of Subchapter S, the liquidating S corporation must generally 
recognize any gain or loss inherent in its assets.336 That gain or loss, of course, 
generally is not taxed to the corporation but is passed through to the share-
holders.337 The shareholders recognize a gain or loss based on the difference 
between the fair market value of the assets received and the basis of the stock 
they hold.338 It seems inappropriate, however, to apply the current S corpora-
tion rules and require gain (or pennit loss) recognition on the termination of 
332 In my prior article I suggested five years. Foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of small 
minds. See S Corp. Burial. supra note 3. at 644. 
333 See Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2)(ii) , -1 (b)(l)(iv). 
334 See supra text accompanying note 74. 
335 See supra notes 264-67. Perhaps the easiest way to accomplish this is (0 bring S corpora-
tions under the self-employment rules. as opposed to continuing their current coverage under 
sections 3101. 3111. and related provisions. See JCX-48-08. supra note 5. at 68; H.R. 3970. 
supra note 272. 
336I.R.C. § 336(a); see supra text accompanying notes 39-40. 
337I.R.C. § 1366. 
338I.R.C. § 331 (a). The gain or loss to the shareholders may not be significant given the 
How-through of the S corporation's liquidation gains and losses. which adjusts the sharehold-
ers> bases before the distribution is made to them. Reg. § 1.1367-1(f). 
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S corporation status.339 The taxpayers are being forced to use another entity;) 
making gain recognition unfair. Typically .. no real disposition is being made. 
Most owners will continue the same business.340 This makes loss recognition 
inappropriate. I therefore recommend that S corporations and their sharehold-
ers be allowed to move to partnerships or disregarded entities on a tax favored 
basis. I apply Subchapter K, and not Subchapter S, to the liquidation of S 
corporations both in the case of partnerships-to-be and (notwithstanding the 
metaphysical challenges) disregarded entities-to-be. I also, of course, apply 
Subchapter K to the for.mation of any subsequent partnership. Subchapter 
K generally makes the liquidation and formation process tax free. Where a 
partnership is formed, the typical result of this process is that the erstwhile 
shareholder's basis in his stock becolTles his basis in what is now a partner-
ship interest.341 Note that this process gives each partner a capital account in 
the partnership equal to the partnership interest's fair market value, and the 
partnership "book bases" in the partnership assets also equal to their fair mar-
ket value.342 Where the S corporation becomes a disregarded entity:> applying 
Subchapter K-like rules will usually give the single owner a carryover basis in 
the assets of the S corporation.343 While the liquidation rules of Subchapter K 
are much more taxpayer friendly than those of Subchapter S, it is possible for 
gain or loss to be recognized under Subchapter K on a liquidation in limited 
circUlTlstances. The liquidation rules are unlikely to apply, however, especially 
if the assets are distributed (or deemed distributed) to the owners in propor-
tional, undivided interests.344 I considered rules that would avoid the recogni-
tion of all gain or loss in all circumstances, but found that the cOlTlplexities 
these rules generated were not worth the statutory effort given that the issue 
should be a minimal one. 
Sufficiently creative taxpayers can find ways of inappropriately taking 
advantage of these generous rules for liquidation of S corporations. To stop, 
or at least impede, this, I recommend Congress authorize the Service to adopt 
339See I.R.C. §§ 331 (a). 336(a). 
340They may want to actually liquidate the S corporation and form, for example, an LLC. 
Or they may want to continue using the state law corporation, which either is disregarded for 
tax purposes if it has a single owner, or is taxed under Subchapter K if it has multiple owners. 
341 See I.R.C. §§ 731(a), 721(a), 732. 
342See Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2)(ii) , -1 (b)(1)(iv). This sentence is probably Greek to those 
without a partnership tax background. Explaining it here would require a multiple-page 
footnote. For those wishing to develop that background, see WILLIS. et at .• supra note 153, 
, 10.04[3][c]. 
343See LR.C. §§ 721 (a), 731 (a), 732. 
344Gain will be recognized if money is distributed in excess of the erstwhile shareholder's 
basis in her stock. Loss will be recognized if only money. inventory, and accounts receivable 
are distributed, and the owner's outside stock basis exceeds the carryover basis she takes in 
these assets. See I.RC. §§ 731 (a), 732. One might ask if an artificial loss could be created. for 
example, by distributing money, inventory, and accounts receivable to a partner in such a way 
that a loss is generated, notwithstanding the fact that on a fair market value basis the partner 
has an economic gain section 751 (b) usually will kibosh that effort. however. 
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an anti-abuse rule that applies to this process.345 
Note that under ITIy proposal, S corporations do not have the option of 
liquidating under the current S corporation rules. This is to prevent taxpayers 
frolll cherry-picking tax treatlTIent, that is, using Subchapter S for S corpora-
tions with net losses in their assets and Subchapter K for S corporations with 
net gains. It is appropriate, however, to have a brief transition period of per-
haps six Illonths where S corporations are allowed to liquidate under either 
Subchapter K or S. Taxpayers planning to liquidate anyway should not be 
caught unawares by the statutory change. While cherry-picking can happen 
during the six months, the associated revenue losses are not likely to be great 
given the limited tirn.e frame. Further, S corporation losses and deductions, 
including depreciation deductions, generally flow through to the sharehold-
ers. 346 In other words, the losses have often already been recognized by the 
shareholders. As a consequence, it is not likely that there are a large number 
of S corporations with large amounts of losses inherent in their assets, though 
there will be some with economic losses that have not yet been taken into 
account for tax purposes.347 
While it is difficult to predict with certainty in the absence of hard data, it 
seems doubtful that permitting largely tax-free liquidations of S corporations 
will generate unacceptable revenue losses for the fisc. Under the current rules, 
S corporations avoid distributing assets that contain significant amounts of 
appreciation. Instead, they commonly retain the property in corporate solu-
tion, depriving the government of a recognition event. In addition, Social 
Security and Medicare tax revenues will no longer be lost, creating a substan-
tial offset. If economic calculations reveal that the cost to the fisc is unduly 
large, some compromise with the suggested approach may have to be found. 
What if the S corporation has earnings and profits or unrecognized section 
1374 gains?348 The equities in this regard are not as strong as the equities in 
favor of allowing nonrecognition of the (nonsection 1374) gains and losses 
inherent in the S corporation assets. The earnings and profits and section 
1374 gains originated with a C corporation, and avoiding any tax conse-
quence also avoids what would have been part of the Subchapter C double 
tax system, and Subchapter C is not being recommended for repeal. That 
said, if a C corporation liquidates under the current rules, it recognizes the 
345 One example: A and B own all of the stock of an S corporation. A individually owns asset 
X and B individually owns asset Y. They wish to exchange these assets with each other. The 
assets do not qualify for like-kind exchange treatment under section 1031. To avoid gain rec-
ognition. they could each contribute the assets to the S corporation. The contribution would 
be tax free under section 351 (a). As parr of a subsequent liquidation of the S corporation under 
Subchapter K. the S corporation could distribute asset Y to A and asset X to B, potentially tax 
free. See I.R.C. § 731. 
346I.R.C. § 1366. 
347 A drop in the value of land, for example, would normally only be recognized in the case 
of taxable disposition. as land is not depreciable. 
348 See supra text accompanying notes 47-55. 
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gains and possibly the losses inherent in its assets, but its earnings and profits 
account is wiped clean.349 Further, the section 1374 gains are only recognized 
for ten years after the C corporation assets find their way into an S corpo-
ration.350 Since under my proposal, the S corporation has up to ten years to 
liquidate~ section 1374 by its own terms normally can be avoided by waiting 
until the end of the section 1374 ten-year term, ·which will be reached before 
the end of the ten-year S corporation liquidation term of my proposal.351 If 
the S corporation chooses to liquidate before the end of the section 1374 
ten-year term, it is presumably due to some tax or other advantage. Having 
section 1374 fully apply in these circumstances is not unfair. Accordingly, on 
liquidation of the S corporation, any remaining section 1374 gains are rec-
ognized, but there should be no dividend effect. Below, I raise the possibility 
of C corporations being allowed to elect to liquidate under Subchapter K. If 
that is permitted, it would of course not make sense to apply section 1374 to 
liquidating S corporations. 
A danger, though not an especially large one, is that C corporations, antici-
pating the law change, might elect Subchapter S shortly before the new stat-
ute is enacted. Under my proposal, they cannot elect after enactment. The 
C-now-S corporation could wait out the ten-year section 1374 period and 
then liquidate, generally tax free, under Subchapter K. But the C corporation 
must live with Subchapter S and section 1374 for ten years. It is not much dif-
ferently positioned than a C corporation that legitimately elects Subchapter 
S, say, one year before the enactment of the new statute. While there is some 
minor potential for game playing here, I do not believe it is worth addressing 
statutorily. Of course, if C corporations are permitted to exist under the rules 
of Subchapter K, discussed below, then there is no abuse potential. 
Should the proposed act contain continuity of business enterprise and 
ownership interest tests? Should the business of the erstwhile S corporation 
be required to be continued for some period of time? Should the erstwhile 
shareholders be required to stay on as partners for some period of time? 352 
While the failure to apply those tests may mean that some owners will be able 
to convert corporate assets to personal use without an income tax effect,353 
on the whole, the better answer to the question is not to apply continuity of 
interest standards. Because S corporations are being forced out of existence, 
349See supra text accompanying notes 25-26. 305. 
35°I.RC. § 1374(d)(7). 
351 Since no neW" S elections are permitted, the last possible S election would take place the 
day before the act takes effect, m.eaning the section 1374 ten-year term expires the day before 
the proposed statute's ten-year term. 
352These rules apply to corporate reorganizations. See BITTKER &: EUSTICE, supra note 1 O~ 
" 12.21. 12.61(2). 
3S3This could not happen with an S corporation, since the distribution of property by an S 
corporation to its shareholders causes gain and possibly loss to be recognized under sections 
311 (b) and 336. On the other hand. a distribution of property by a partnership to a partner 
is generally not recognized to either party. See I.R.C. § 731; but see I.RC. §§ 704(c)(1)(B), 
707(a)(2)(B). 737. 751 (b). 
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the equities favor an owner-friendly set of rules. Also, aside frofil the possibil-
ity of converting business assets to personal use, which will likely be uncom-
Inon, the relevant tax consequences after the conversion are sifililar to, or even 
worse than, those before the conversion. Some examples: A sale of stock in 
the S corporation usually generates a capital gain or loss. The sale of a partner-
ship interest may generate ordinary income.354 The gain or loss on the sale of 
business assets generally flows through to the shareholders for S corporations 
and to partners for partnerships. Also, determining whether the continuity 
tests are met will create additional complexity that does not seem worth the 
statutory effort. Numerous questions will arise. How long should the busi-
ness be operated? What if the assets are used in a different business? How 
Inuch of an ownership change is permitted? Many of these issues have been 
addressed in the corporate context. But in the case of S corporations being 
forced out of existence, the courts might address these issues differently. 355 
Further, if continuity provisions are enacted, most owners likely will continue 
the business long enough to pass muster" so little revenue will be raised. 
The conversion of S corporations can generate state tax and nontax costs, if 
the corporation actually liquidates and contributes its assets to, for example, 
an LLC. State income and, more commonly, transfer taxes can apply. These 
vary a great deal froIn jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In SOfile cases they will pose 
a significant limitation, in others not. Transfer taxes often apply principally 
to real estate. Partnerships, rather than S corporations, have always been the 
preferred vehicle in which to hold real estate.356 Accordingly, transfer taxes 
m.ay pose less of a burden than appears at first blush. One also hopes that 
states will follow the Congressional lead, and permit S corporations to liqui-
date without a significant tax iOl.pact. As discussed above, states can assist this 
process by perfilitting direct entity conversions of corporations into LLCs, 
thereby avoiding transfer tax and transfer restriction problefils that might 
otherwise arise.357 
B. C Corporations 
For newly form.ed C corporations electing to be taxed under Subchapter K, 
rules will need to be developed that track the section 704(b} allocation rules 
with the m.ultiple classes of stock possible in a C corporation. Other special 
issues Inay arise, but they should be manageable. A separate question arises 
for existing nonpublic C corporations wishing to elect Subchapter K, (or 
disregarded entity status). How should they get from here to there? It does 
not seem. equitable for them or their owners to pay a substantial tax penalty 
to get into the entity of choice of the day, a choice that m.ay not even have 
354 See LR.C. § 751(a). 
355See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10. !! 12.21, 12.61[2]. 
356An exception is when the capital gain freeze technique is used. See supra text accoITlpany-
ing notes 192-202. 
357 See supra teXt accompanying notes 183-85. 
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been available at the time they w-ere formed. Therefore, if it does not break the 
back of the fisc, I recommend that qualifying, existing C corporations also be 
allowed to follow- the sam.e procedures as described above for S corporations, 
that is, during the ten-year w-indow-, to liquidate under Subchapter K. As 
Subchapter C is continuing, I do not make this approach mandatory as I do 
for S corporations. It would be almost impossible to keep track of C corpora-
tions liquidating for independent reasons and those liquidating to continue 
under Subchapter K. Thus, C corporations have the option of liquidating 
under the current rules, which they will prefer if overall it generates losses.358 
As noted above, under the current rules, gain and possibly loss is recog-
nized on an actual liquidation, but the earnings and profits account is nor-
mally w-iped clean.359 Thus, what the fisc is giving up under my proposal is 
not the tax on dividend income, which in the case of a liquidation it w-ill not 
collect, but the tax on the net gains inherent in the assets of some nonpublicly 
traded C corporations. I say some, because many corporations w-ill not sell or 
distribute many of those assets if it means paying a tax. Further, for domestic 
transactions, at least, C corporations are not a popular vehicle for non public 
businesses. LLCs have become the entity of choice.360 It will be important for 
the number crunchers to crunch the nUInbers, but the cost to the fisc may 
not be that high. 
Some will view- my proposal as an unduly liberal giveaway. And indeed, as 
I discuss below, its cost may be too high. But there are also economic ineffi-
ciencies that are created when some taxpayers are forced to operate within an 
outdated form and others are not. New businesses forming LLCs have a com-
petitive advantage over older businesses trapped in C corporations. Electing 
S corporation status may not be available if their ownership structure does 
not permit a single class of stock. Leveling the playing field should make for 
a more efficient economy. 
If the costs to the fisc of my proposal for existing C corporations are too 
high, a simple solution, and probably as reasonable as any, is simply to leave 
the current rules for liquidating C corporations in effect with one adjustment. 
That is to say, existing nonpublic C corporations may, during the ten-year 
window, elect Subchapter K or disregarded entity status, but if they do so 
they are deemed to liquidate under Subchapter C, recognizing the gains and 
possibly the losses per its rules.361 The adjustment: To limit the tax pain, I 
propose that the taxes owed be payable over five years. 
Whichever of these rules are used for existing C corporations, they should 
only apply during the ten-year window. To allow these tax benefits for C cor-
porations that liquidate after the ten-year window is to permit them to have 
358 It is not out of the question that they will prefer it in a gain situation, as it means a basis 
step up. 
359I.R.C. § 336; BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 10,' 10.05[2][b]. See supra text accompa-
nying note 305. 
36iJSeesupra text accompanying notes 19-35.67-108. 
361 See supra text accompanying notes 24-25. 
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their cake and eat it to~ using Subchapter C when it is beneficial and switch-
ing to Subchapter K when it is not~ indefinitely. 
Assuming a favorable environment in which qualifying C corporations can 
elect Subchapter K at a low tax cost, will the LLC revolution be reversed or 
at least slowed? Rather than forming LLCs, will taxpayers form corporations 
and elect Subchapter K? While this is not necessarily a bad thing, it is not a 
likelihood for nontax reasons. State LLC statutes have more modern, flexible 
statutory architectures in comparison to typical corporate statutes.362 Indeed, 
many who prefer for whatever reason to operate in C corporations for tax 
purposes often form LLCs and then check the box to be taxed as C corpo-
rations to take advantage of the greater state law flexibility LLCs offers. 363 
Further, it is safer to be in an LLC if Congress changes its mind. Congress is 
more likely to change the way state law corporations are taxed than the way 
LLCs are taxed~ given the history of each. 
Conversely, would it make sense to only allow the use of C corporations 
for corporations that are publicly held or are about to go public? My recom-
mendations are an attempt to put all businesses on the same playing field, 
but some could opt to use or stay with C corporations. Should that option 
be available? Generally, the answer is yes. C corporations are too woven into 
the economic fabric to not allow people to use them. For example, as noted 
earlier, C corporations are often preferred for outbound foreign transactions 
because of the preferential tax rates many treaties give dividends, and pre-
ferred for inbound transactions due to the imperfections with the branch 
profits tax.364 But, C corporations are reported to often be used for an extra 
run up the rate brackets, and that likely will become a more common reason 
for using C corporations in a tax universe where LLCs are otherwise usually 
the more logical choice.365 At the sam.e time, taxpayers making legitimate 
use of C corporations should not have a radically different tax structure than 
individuals. As a compromise position, and to help offset possible revenue 
losses from my proposals, I recommend that the 150/0 corporate bracket of 
section 11 be eliminated, and thus that the tax rate on the first $75,000 of 
income be 250/0. 
C. 7he States 
I have already discussed the need for states to cooperate with this process. A 
related question is whether states will use the new single tax burden on (at 
least most) closely held business entities as an opportunity to increase their 
own taxes. That is to some extent already going on. An increasing number of 
362 See BISHOP & KLEINBERGER. supra note 17. ! 1.02. 
363LLCs can also elect to be taxed as S corporations. See l.RS. Form 2553. 
364 See supra text accompanying notes 28-30. 
365 See supra text accompanying notes 30-32. 
Tax Lawyer, Vol. 62. No. 3 
INTEGRATING SUBCHAPTERS K AND S 821 
states are taxing LLCs at the entity level.366 While this trend .may continue~ it 
does not provide a reason for the federal government not to establish a more 
rational tax systern.. The 50 states and the District of Columbia compete with 
one another. Let that competition and their voters determine their tax sys-
tems. 
XI.X.. Conclusion 
The repeal of Subchapter S is justified both on grounds of tax efficiency and 
political realism.. The country does not need two pass-through business entity 
tax regiITles, and only the repeal of Subchapter S is politically realistic. A few 
relatively modest Code changes permit the important, defensible benefits of 
Subchapter S to be retained. The repeal of Subchapter S allows the Service to 
make better use of its personnel. It also makes for readier reforITl of Subchapter 
K. The Treasury and Congress, their attention no longer divided between two 
tax systeITlS, and their liITlited human resources no longer spread as thin, can 
bring greater focus to that task. Finally, the tiITle has COITle to allow nonpublic 
C corporations to elect Subchapter K as well, ideally on a taxpayer-friendly 
basis. Shareholders should not be trapped with an antiquated choice. 
366 See Bruce P. Ely, Christopher R Grissom, & Matthew S. Houser, Charts Comparing ~he 
State Tax Treatment of LLCs and LLPs, in LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY HANDBOOK § 3: 118 
(Mark Sargent & Walter Schwidetzky eds., 2008). 
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